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COMMENT
INTRODUCTION

Where both the employer and a third party would be liable
under general tort law for an injury to the employee, 1 but the
employer's liability to the employee is limited to payments under the
workers' compensation law, 2 can the third party recover indemnity or
contribution from the employer? It is the interrelationship of the conflicting rights, obligations, and interests of' the three parties in this
situation which is the subject of this Comment.
Workers' compensation laws 3 provide for payments to be made
directly or indirectly by the employer 4 to the employee, regardless of
negligence or fault, in compensation for an accidental injury or death
arising out of the injured party's employment. 5 This compensation is
the exclusive liability of' the employer, 6 and the exclusive remedy of
the employee as against the employer, 7 for damages "on account of"

' The problem under discussion usually arises when the employer has allegedly caused or
contributed to the injury or death of the employee through negligent conduct. See, e.g., American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 1950); Ruvolo v. United States Steel
Corp., 139 N.J. Super. 578, 582, 354 A.2d 685, 688 (Law Div. 1976); Schweizer v. Elox Div. of
Colt Indus., 133 N.J. Super. 297, 299, 336 A.2d 73, 74 (Law Div. 1975), aff'd, 70 N.J. 280, 359
A.2d 857 (1976).
2 See note 6 infra and accompanying text.
' Although the state and federal compensation laws vary among themselves in many aspects, the differences are not material to this discussion except where noted. For a detailed
discussion of workers' compensation law, see generally A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION (1976).
a In practice, payments are rarely made directly by the employer. Some states provide for
compulsory insurance. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); see
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-71, -77, -78 (West 1959 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
1 E.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1976);
see, e.g., Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3600 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-7 (West 1959). Such compensation is usually payable for any accidental injury or death
of the employee sustained "in the performance of his duty" due to any cause except his own
intoxication or intentional misconduct. Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 8102(a) (1976); accord, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959).
6 See, e.g., Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3600 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-40 (West 1959); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965 & Cur. Supp. 19771978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
' E.g., Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8 116 (c) (1976), as interpreted
in, e.g., Joyce v. United States, 474 F.2d 215, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1973); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West 1959 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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the injury. 8 The benefit gained by the employee in being guaranteed compensation for accidental injury regardless of fault offsets his
inability to sue the employer on the basis of fault. The benefits provided under the workers' compensation laws substitute for and replace the standard tort remedies which would have been available
under the common law. 9
Provisions are made for the employee to sue a liable third party,
and for the claim to be assigned to the employer or his insurance
carrier if the injured employee fails to bring an action against the
third party promptly. 10 In the event of a recovery from a third
party, the employer's liability is limited to the difference between
such recovery and the workers' compensation obligation, if the former
is less than the latter. 1 Where the recovery from a third party ex-

The phrase "on account of" is used in the following statutory formulations: Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 440.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1978), N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1965 & Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
The use of-this phrase has been considered important by many courts in delineating the scope
of the employer's liability. See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S.
124, 129-31 (1956), discussed in notes 62-67 infra and accompanying text; New England Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 420, 427 (D. Vt. 1975), discussed in
note 35 infra; Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y.
175, 179, 15 N.E.2d 567, 568 (1938), discussed in text accompanying notes 57-61 infra; Gordon
H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting Co., 273 Or. 179, 185, 539 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1975), discussed
in text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
9 The Supreme Court has interpreted the exclusivity provision of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, now codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976), as follows:
The obvious purpose of this provision is to make the statutory liability of an
employer to, contribute to its employee's compensation the exclusive liability of such
employer to its employee, or to anyone claiming under or through such employee,
on account of his injury or death arising out of that employment. In return, the
employee, and those claiming under or through him, are given a substantial quid
pro quo in the form of an assured compensation, regardless of fault, as a substitute
for their excluded claims.
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129 (1956) (emphasis deleted).
Similarly, another federal court has stated, "[a]s a general rule, workmen's compensation
statutes terminate the private employer's common law tort liability and substitute a duty to pay
a prescribed compensation not based on fault." Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1364
(D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 74, 68
S.E.2d 384, 387-88 (1951); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 677, 39 A.2d 858, 859
(1944); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Minn. 1977).
10 See, e.g., Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8131 (1976); Longshoremen's and'Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 933(b), (e) (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-40 (West 1959); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 29 (McKinney 1965 & Cum. Supp. 19771978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1972 repl.).
11 E.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 9 3 3 (g)
(1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40(c) (West 1959); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 29(4) (McKinney
1965).
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ceeds the workers' compensation obligation, the employer is entitled
to be reimbursed for its workers' compensation outlay out of the recovery from the third party.1 2 Workers' compensation laws, however, generally fail to make any provision for the situation in which
both the employer and the third party would be liable to the
employee under the general tort law, but the employer's liability on
13
the basis of' fault is barred by the workers' compensation law.
The balance achieved by the workers' compensation laws between the rights of the employer and those of the employee does not
affect the liability of a third party to an injured employee.' 4 Therefore, the workers' compensation law governs the employer's liability
to the employee, and the general tort law governs the third party's
liability to the employee. When both the employer and the third
party would be liable to the employee under the rules of the general
tort law, the two dissimilar systems must be reconciled in order to
determine the rights and obligations of the employer and the third
party inter se. 15
When a plaintiff sues one of several parties who were responsible
for his injury, two remedies have been developed to protect the sued
16
tortfeasor from being saddled with the entire liability: indemnity
and contribution. 17 Indemnity, which may be based upon either an
express or implied promise, shifts the entire loss from the one held
legally responsible to another.'
Contribution is an equitable con12 E.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 933(e), (f)
(1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40(b) (West 1959). For a list of relevant state statutes, see
generally Davis, Third-Party Tortfeasors' Rights Where Compensation-Covered Employers Are
Negligent-Where Do Dole and Sunspan Lead?, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571, 594 app. (1976).
13 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
14 See American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 953 (8th Cir. 1950); Schweizer v.
Elox Div. of Colt Indus., 70 N.J. 280, 287, 359 A.2d 857, 861 (1976); Letman v. Milau Assocs.,
77 Misc. 2d 29, 31, 352 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
15 The problem is discussed in terms of the interaction between two conflicting systems in
Davis, supra note 12, passim.
16 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 310-13 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1937); Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent
Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REV. 517 (1952); Greenstone, Spreading the
Loss-Indemnity, Contribution, Comparative Negligence and Subrogation, 13 FORUM 266
(1977); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1938);
Comment, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 33 TENN. L. REV. 184 (1966).
17 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 50, at 305-10; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 81 (1937); Dauber, New Jersey Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, 7 RUTGERtS L. REV.
380 (1953); Greenstone, supra note 16; Leflar, supra note 16.
18 Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370-71, 104 N.W.2d 843,
847 (1960); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107
N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952); W. PROSSERs, supra note 16, § 51, at 310 (4th ed. 1971); see George's
Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1942). But see Young v.
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cept which requires joint tortleasors to share the burden of the loss.19
Simply stated, the question under discussion is whether the
workers' compensation law bars an indemnity or contribution recovery by the third party from the employer where both would be liable
in the absence of the applicable workers' compensation law.2 0 This
problem has been described by Professor Larson, a noted authority
on workers' compensation law, as "[p]erhaps the most evenly21
balanced controversy in all of compensation law."
When the employer has made an express contract to indemnify
the third party against the type of loss actually incurred, the claim by
the third party against the employer is nearly always successful. 2 2 At
the opposite end of the spectrum, contribution from the employer is
almost never granted, since it is based on joint liability in tort to the
injured party.23 Between these extremes is the complex area of' implied indemnity. Whether a third party is entitled to recover implied
indemnity from an employer hinges in part on the language of' the
"exclusive liability" provision of the applicable workers' compensation
statute. A common formulation of this provision is: "The liability of an
employer ... shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee . . . and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer . . . on account of' such injury
or death
."24
The question then becomes whether the employer
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 Wis. 2d 36, 55, 168 N.W.2d 112, 122-23 (1969), discussed'in note
27 infra.
19 Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342, 346 (1st Cir. 1969); Hendrickson

v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370-71, 104 N.W.2d 843, 846-47 (1960);
Comment, ContributionAmong Tortfeasors-The Need for Clarification, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. &
PROC. 75, 79 (1974).

Contribution between joint tortfeasors was not available at common law, but it "is now in
effect, in one form or another, in about half of the states." UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS

ACT, COMMISSIONER'S PREFATORY NOTE (1955 Revision),

12 UNIFORM LAWS

ANNOTATED 60 (1975).
20 Since the employee cannot sue the employer directly, see notes 6-7 supra and accom-

panying text, a third party held liable to the employee will bear the entire burden regardless of
the employer's negligence unless the third party can shift all or part of the burden to the
employer through indemnity or contribution.
21 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.10, at 14-287. This statement has been quoted repeatedly by both courts and commentators, and Professor Larson commented in the 1976 edition of his treatise (twenty-three years after the statement was first published) that it was "as
true as it ever was." Id. at 14-287 n.62.
22 See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
23 See note 157 infra and accompanying text.
24 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976); see
N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
For a comparison of typical formulations of the exclusive liability provision, see Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REv. 959,
962--63 (1956). The author concluded that
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has a liability to the third party which is not "on account of" the
injury to the employee. Thus, many courts have maintained that the
third party cannot recover from the employer unless the employer
had an "independent duty" to the third party.2 5 The question of
what constitutes a sufficient independent duty is not a simple one,
and the standard appears to vary widely among jurisdictions.
The first part of this Comment addresses the problem of identifying those situations in which a majority of courts allow a third party
to recover from the employer. The solution is usually found, at least
implicitly, through a determination of what constitutes an "independent duty." 2 6 A number of cases are examined and organized
according to various types of relationships which have been held sufficient to support common law indemnity in the absence of the
workers' compensation exclusivity provision. This Comment then
explores the alternative solutions which have been adopted by courts
or recommended by commentators. It concludes with a discussion of
constitutional and policy considerations and a recommendation for
legislative change.
ExPRESS INDEMNITY

In most jurisdictions, it is well settled that when the claim of the
third party against the employer is for indemnity under an express
contract, the workers' compensation law does not bar the indemnification. 2 7 For example, in the leading New Jersey case of Yearicks v.
the wording of the statutes is not a decisive factor in determining their application.
Some of the more comprehensive clauses, such as that in the New York statute,
have been found not to limit the employer's liability to the third party, whereas an
ambiguous clause, such as is found in the New Jersey statute, has been held to
abrogate such liability.

Id. at 963.
25 See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 130 (1956),
discussed in notes 62-67 infra and accompanying text; Kamali v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 54 Haw.
153, 159, 504 P.2d 861, 865 (1972); Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small
Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 179-80, 15 N.E.2d 567, 568-69 (1938), discussed in text accompanying notes 57-61 infra. For detailed discussion of the independent duty concept, see notes
56-69 infra and accompanying text.
26 See Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1974).
27 E.g., Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. American Sur. Co., 365 F.2d 412, 413, 416

(10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Arrow Stevedoring Co., 175 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1949);
Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds sub.

nor. American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 420, 427 (D. Vt. 1975); Severn v. United States, 69
F. Supp. 21, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Green v. War Shipping Administration, 66 F. Supp. 393,
394-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 508, 378 A.2d 53,
71 (Law Div. 1977); Karadis Bros. Painting v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 119 N.J.
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City of Wildwood, 28 it was held that "by reason of the indemnification provision in the contract," the third party had a cause of action
for indemnification from the employer. 29 The court did not, however, discuss the effect of its holding on the workers' compensation
30
scheme.
The Oregon supreme court addressed the same issue in Gordon
H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting Co.31 The trial court had held that
an action against the employer for indemnity, even if based upon an
express contract, was barred by the Oregon workers' compensation
law. 3 2 The statutory provision provided that the complying employer
"is relieved of all other liability for compensable injuries to his subject workmen . ..and [to] anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer on account of such injuries." 33 The supreme
court, in reversing, stated that the statute was not "intended to preSuper. 446, 453, 292 A.2d 42, 45 (Ch. Div. 1972); Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 N.J. Super.
379, 384, 92 A.2d 873, 876 (Law Div. 1952); Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d
29, 31, 230 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1967); Tucci & Sons v. Carl T. Madsen, Inc., 1 Wash. App. 1035,
1040-41, 467 P.2d 386, 389-90 (1970); Young v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 Wis. 2d 36, 54,
168 N.W.2d 112, 122 (1969); Algrem v. Nowlan, 37 Wis. 2d 70, 75, 154 N.W.2d 217, 219
(1967); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.41, at 14-324 & n.37.
In some cases a factor apart from the workers' compensation law has barred recoveries
based on express contracts to indemnify. The third party's liability to the employee is usually
based on actual negligence, and most courts construe indemnity clauses strictly and refuse to
allow a party to be indemnified against its own negligence unless the contract explicitly so provides. Smith v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th Cir. 1975); Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d 179, 182-83 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); George M.
Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 32-33, 109 A.2d 805, 811 (1954); Joe
Adams & Son v. McCann Constr. Co., 475 S.W.2d 721, 723-24 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1972). Compare
Tucci & Sons v. Carl T. Madsen, Inc., 1 Wash. App. 1035, 1038, 467 P.2d 386, 388 (1970)
(requiring subcontractor to indemnify contractor under indemnification provision of express contract, for losses due solely to negligence of indemnitee) with Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., 84
Wash. 2d 518, 520-23, 527 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (1974) (overruling Tucci).
The problem is outside the scope of this Comment. However, its effect in one jurisdiction,
Wisconsin, warrants some discussion. Wisconsin has held that only an express contract is sufficient to overcome the workers' compensation bar. Algrem v. Nowlan, 37 Wis. 2d 70, 75, 154
N.W.2d 217, 219 (1967). Therefore, where there was an express contract to indemnify the third
party which did not explicitly protect the third party against the consequences of its own negligence, Wisconsin held that the employer was required to indemnify the third party only to the
extent of the employer's own negligence. Young v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 Wis. 2d 36,
55-56, 168 N.W.2d 112, 122-23 (1969). The result is in effect a partial indemnity, or contribution relative to fault. Id.
28 23 N.J. Super. 379, 92 A.2d 873 (Law Div. 1952).
29 Id. at 384, 92 A.2d at 876.
30

id.

273 Or. 179, 539 P.2d 1059 (1975).
Id. at 183, 539 P.2d at 1061.
3 Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 Or. Laws ch. 285, § 6, 564 (current versions at OR.
REV. STAT. § 656.018 (1977 repl.)), quoted in Gordon H. Ball, 273 Or. at 183 n.2, 539 P.2d at
1061.
31

32
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clude an employer from voluntarily contracting with a third party to
indemnify it for damages paid to an injured employee. . . . [Tihe
immunity conferred on the employer . . . is only against actions for
damages on account of an employee's injury." 34 Therefore, the court
stated that the exclusive liability provision did not bar "an action for
indemnity based on the breach of an independent duty owed by the
35
employer."
Among the very few cases which hold that the third party cannot
be indemnified by the employer despite an express contract is Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Rota-Cone Field Operating Co. 36 Basing its decision
upon the statutory provision that a workers' compensation employer
"shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever," 3 7
the New
Mexico appellate court held that it was the intention of the legislature
to render void any contract imposing greater liability on the
39
employer.38 Other courts have not agreed with this construction.
In Tucci & Sons v. Carl T. Madsen, Inc.,40 a Washington court held
that even a statute which specifically provided that "[n]o employer or
workman shall exempt himself from the burden or waive the benefits

34 273 Or. at 185, 539 P.2d at 1062 (emphasis in original).
35 id.; see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 420
(D. Vt. 1975), wherein the court stated that:
[W]here an express contractual obligation to indemnify is involved, the exclusivity
section generally is held not to bar recovery, on the basis that the third party's
action for indemnity is not for the "damages" referred to therein but for reimbursement, and not "on account of" the employee's injury but on account of an
independent duty owed by the employer to the third party.
Id. at 427 (citing 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.30, at 14-324).
The court also pointed out that the third party and the employer "were two substantial
corporations, of equal bargaining power, who may be taken to have known what they were
doing when they wrote the contract." Id. at 428.
36 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1972). Apparently, the only other cases denying
indemnity despite an express indemnification clause are those decided under the provisions of
the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). The 1972 amendments provide that when the employee recovers from
the vessel for its negligence, "the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages
directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void." Id. The
Senate Committee Report makes it clear that the employer cannot be required to indemnify the
vessel on any theory. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972); see, e.g., Meredith v. A
& P Boat Rentals, Inc,, 414 F. Supp. 788, 790-91 (E.D. La. 1976).
3' An Act Relating to Workmen's Compensation, Exempting Employees from Liability in
Certain Circumstances, 1971 N.M. Laws ch. 253, § 2, 928 (current version at N.M. STAT.
ANN. & 59-10-5 (2d rep!. 1974)).
38 84 N.M. at 485, 505 P.2d at 80.
" E.g., United States v. Arrow Stevedoring Co., 175 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1949)
(exclusivity provision does not take "from the employer the right to contract for such a liability")
(emphasis in original).
40 1 Wash. App. 1035, 467 P.2d 386 (1970).
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of [workers' compensation] by any contract . . .and any such contract
.. . shall be pro tanto void, '" 4 1 did not prevent the employer from
contracting for increased liability. 4 2
The rationale behind the holding that an express contract to indemnify is not barred by the workers' compensation law 4 3 is not always clearly stated in the cases. 4 4 Some opinions appear to be
grounded on freedom to contract or waiver of immunity. 4 5 The
majority seem to be based on the theory that the employer's duty to
indemnify the third party under an express contract is independent of
the employer's obligation to the employee under the workers' com46
pensation law.
IMPLIED INDEMNITY

While a few courts have stated that only an express contract to
indemnity is sufficient to overcome the bar of the workers' compensation laws, 4 7 other courts have held that the workers' compensation
41 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.060 (1962) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.060
(Supp. 1978)).
42 1 Wash. App. at 1041-43, 467 P.2d at 390-91. The opinion seems to imply that although
the statute did impose "a constitutionally permissible limitation upon an employer's capacity to
contract," id.at 1041, 467 P.2d at 390, it has "limited application," id. at 1043, 467 P.2d at 391,
and the employer in this case did not invalidly waive the benefits of workers' compensation, id.
at 1041-43, 467 P.2d at 390-91.
43 But see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rota-Cone Field Operating Co., 84 N.M. 483, 485, 505 P.2d
78, 80 (Ct. App. 1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
44 E.g., Severn v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 21, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Green v. War Shipping Administration, 66 F. Supp. 393, 394-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); Yearicks v. City of Wildwood,
23 N.J. Super. 379, 384, 92 A.2d 873, 876 (Law Div. 1952); Hintz v. Darling Freight, Inc., 17
Wis. 2d 376, 378-79, 117 N.W.2d 271, 272 (1962).
45 See, e.g., American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230 Md. 584,
590, 187 A.2d 864, 867 (1963); Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 31, 230
N.E.2d 667, 669 (1967).
46 See, e.g., Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1974); New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 420, 427 (D. Vt. 1975);
Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting Co., 273 Or. 179, 185, 539 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1975);
Tucci & Sons v. Carl T. Madsen, Inc., 1 Wash. App. 1035, 1040-41, 467 P.2d 386, 389-90
(1970).
4' Bagwell v. South La. Elec. Coop. Ass'n, 228 So. 2d 555, 561 (La. Ct. of App. 1969);
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230 Md. 584, 590, 187 A.2d
864, 867 (1963); Karadis Bros. Painting Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 119 N.J.
Super. 446, 453, 292 A.2d 42, 45 (Ch. Div. 1972); Grede Foundries, Inc. v. Price Erecting Co.,
38 Wis. 2d 502, 505, 157 N.W.2d 559, 560 (1968); Algrem v. Nowlan, 37 Wis. 2d 70, 75, 154
N.W.2d 217, 219 (1967); Engel v. Bindel, 27 Wis. 2d 456, 460, 134 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1965).
Contra, e.g., Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J. Super. 580, 584, 166 A.2d 784, 786 (App. Div. 1960).
In American Radiator, the court stated that:
[E]mployers in Maryland [are] entitled to rely on the assumption that they would
not be liable for or on account of an injury to an employee, beyond payment of
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law only affects the relationship between the employer and the
employee, and therefore the common law right to indemnity is not
abrogated. 4 8 It is in the area of implied indemnity that the problems
involved in recovery from the employer by the third party are the
most complex. Even in the absence of the workers' compensation bar
the question of when implied indemnity should be allowed is itself
confusing; the law is unsettled in many jurisdictions and varies widely
among them. 49 The situation is doubly confusing when the workers'
compensation bar is involved.
Which situations, under the principles of the general tort law,
give rise to an implied duty to indemnify is outside the scope of this
Comment. Suffice it to say that the bases upon which indemnity has
compensation, unless they expressly waived immunity by agreeing to assume an
obligation for contribution or indemnity.
230 Md. at 590, 187 A.2d at 867.
In a few jurisdictions, statutes have been upheld which explicitly allow recovery from the
employer only on the basis of an express contract to indemnify. For example, in 1959, the
California legislature enacted a provision prohibiting recovery of indemnity from the employer
in the absence of an express indemnification agreement. An Act to Add Section 3864 to the
Labor Code, 1959 Cal. Stats. ch. 955, § 1, 2986 (current version at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3864
(West 1971)). Indemnification from the employer based upon a contrast between active and
passive fault or upon a contractual relationship was permitted prior to the enactment of this
provision, but could not be recovered against the employer after the provision took effect. E.B.
Wills Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 653-54, 128 Cal. Rptr. 541, 543 (1976);
Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 607-08, 57 Cal. Rptr. 701,
703-04 (1967).
A similar Minnesota statute, An Act Relating to Benefits Under the Workmen's Compensation Law, 1969 Minn. Laws ch. 936, § 4, 1806 (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.061(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978)), was held to bar implied indemnity in Leppala v. Sawbill
Canoe Outfitters, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 409, 410-12 (D. Minn. 1973). However, the Minnesota
supreme court held the provision unconstitutional in Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 369,
215 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1974). See text accompanying notes 353-66 infra.
48 E.g., Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 855, 118 N.W.2d 559,
565 (1963); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 374, 104 N.W.2d
843, 849 (1960); Wentworth Hotel, Inc. v. F.A. Gray, Inc., 110 N.H. 458, 460, 272 A.2d 583,
584 (1970); see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 273 Or. 162, 176,
539 P.2d 1065, 1072 (1975). In support of this position, the Oregon court in Kaiser Gypsum
quoted the United States Supreme Court as follows:
"repeals by implication are not favored, and, indeed, that a statute will not be
construed as taking away a common-law right existing at the date of its enactment,
unless that result is imperatively required; that is to say, unless it be found that the
pre-existing right is so repugnant to the statute that the survival of such right would
in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its efficacy; in other words, render its
provisions nugatory."
273 Or. at 176, 539 P.2d at 1072 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426, 437 (1907)).
9 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 16; Davis, supra note 16; O'Donnell, Implied
Indemnity in Modern Tort Litigation: The Case for a Public Policy Analysis, 6 SETON HALL L.
REV. 268 (1975).
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been allowed in the absence of an express contract include situations
in which: a relationship between the indemnitor and the indemnitee
created duties between them; 5o an intrinsic difference existed in the
52
quality of fault; 5 1 or there was a disparity in degree of fault.
The relative negligence of the parties is always a matter of concern, even in jurisdictions which hold that disparity of fault alone
cannot justify imposing a duty to indemnify. Requiring indemnification would not be equitable or just except in situations where there is
a sufficiently clear disparity between the parties in degree of either
negligence or responsibility to justify placing the entire burden on
the indemnitor. 53 Furthermore, in the majority of cases the party
seeking indemnity has negligently contributed to the injury, since
otherwise it would not have been found liable to the injured party
and would not be seeking indemnification. 54 Therefore, the question

50 The duties may be imposed by law, as when a negligent bailee is required to indemnify a
vicariously liable bailor, see, e.g., Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 215-16, 148 P.2d 633, 642
(1944); or by contract between the parties, see, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 130-34 (1956); Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845,
850-52, 855, 118 N.W.2d 559, 562-65 (1963); McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-HanksWalsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788, 792, 794 (Mo. 1959).
" New Jersey recognizes the right of a party whose fault is not personal, but merely imputed, vicarious, or constructive, to recover indemnity from the negligent party. This is commonly called "primary-secondary liability." Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32
N.J. 55, 79-MO, 159 A.2d 97, 109-10 (1960); see Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38
N.J. Super. 419, 432, 119 A.2d 172, 179-80 (App. Div. 1955); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co.,
152 N.J. Super. 471, 489, 378 A.2d 53, 62 (Law Div. 1977); Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe,
366 Pa. 322, 325-28, 77 A.2d 368, 370-71 (1951); O'Donnell, supra note 49, at 275-76.
5' E.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 399-402 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 951 (1964). Although the controversial "active-passive" theory of implied indemnity is
often said to apply to "situations where one tortfeasor, by his active conduct, has created a
danger to the plaintiff, and the other has merely failed to discover or to remedy it," W. PROSSER,
supra note 16, at 312, it has been argued that in this situation "the difference between the
liability of the two tortfeasors is solely one of degree," O'Donnell, supra note 49, at 274. New
Jersey has explicitly rejected this basis for implied indemnity. Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v.
Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 81, 159 A.2d 97, 110-11 (1960), discussed in text accompanying
note 175 infra.
53 See Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1974); W. PRoSSER,
supra note 16, at 313.
54 In some cases, however, the third party may be strictly or vicariously liable, and free
from personal fault. See, e.g., Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 204, 208-09, 148 P.2d 633, 636,
638 (1944); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kohn Bros. Tobacco Co., 141 Conn. 539, 542,
107 A.2d 406, 407 (1954); Dale v. Whiteman, 388 Mich. 698, 701, 202 N.W.2d 797, 798 (1972);
Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 351-52, 63 N.W.2d 355, 357-58 (1954). For discussion
of these cases, see notes 74-79 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v.

Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 64, 67, 159 A.2d 97, 101, 103 (1960) (airplane owner held absolutely
liable for ground damage caused by airplane).
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may arise as to when, and whether, a party should be indemnified
against the consequences of' its own negligence. 55
Independent Duty
When implied indemnity is sought from an employer by a third
party held liable to an injured employee, an additional factor is important in the determination of when indemnity should be allowed.
As discussed above, the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation law has been held by many courts to restrict the employer's
duty to indemnify the third party to situations where the employer
breached an "independent duty" owed to the third party. 56
The case which initiated the use of the independent duty theory
to justify recovery from the employer was the 1938 case of Westchester
Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp. 5 7 In
Westchester, it was alleged that the employer negligently broke a gas
pipe in constructing a drain under a highway, resulting in the death
of an employee from the escaping gas. 5 8 The third party, the gas
company that maintained the gas line, was held liable for the
employee's death because it had negligently failed to discover the
escaping gas. 59 Voicing the rationale upon which the gas company
was entitled to indemnity from the employer, the Court of Appeals of
New York stated that the gas company did "not sue for damages 'on
account of" [the employee's] death. Plaintiff assert[ed] its own right of
recovery for breach of an alleged independent duty or obligation
owed to it by the defendant." '6 0 The court concluded that "[a]n in-

" Some courts have held that only a party not personally at fault can recover implied
indemnity. For example, "under Louisiana law an intention to indemnity, the indemnitee against
his own negligence will not be presumed in the absence of a clear and specific stipulation to
that effect." Mills v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 786, 790 (W.D. La. 1964). The
Louisiana courts, therefore, restrict recovery of implied indemnity to situations where the indemnitee "is only technically or constructively at fault," Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 46, 91 So. 539, 541 (1922), or, in other words, "only vicariously at fault,"
Comment, The Right of a Third Party to Contribution or Indemnity from a Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Employer, 38 TULANE L. REV. 536, 548-49 (1964). See also General Elec.
Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1968). In New Jersey, a similar result

is couched in terms of "primary-secondary liability." See notes 70-72 infra and accompanying
text.
56 E.g., Santisteven v. Dow Chein. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1974); Western

Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grolier Inc., 501 F.2d 434, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1974).
57 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
51 Id. at 177, 15 N.E.2d at 567.

59 Id. at 177-78, 15 N.E.2d at 567.
60 Id.

at 179, 15 N.E.2d at 568.
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dependent duty or obligation . .. [was] a sufficient basis for the action." 61
The United States Supreme Court adopted the independent duty
justification for implied indemnity in one of the few cases in which
the Court has addressed this problem, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. 62 Ryan, decided under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 6 3 involved
a shipowner held liable to a longshoreman whose injuries were due to
the negligence of his employer, the stevedoring company. 6 4 The
Supreme Court held that the company had an implied contractual
obligation to perform its duties in a reasonably safe manner, arising
from its express contract with the shipowner to stow the cargo. 6 5
Upon the breach of this contractual obligation, the shipowner was
entitled to indemnity. 66 The shipowner's claim for indemnity was
based upon "an independent contractual right. It [was] not an action
by or on behalf of' the employee and it [was] not one to recover damages 'on account of' an employee's 'injury or death.' "67 Although
Ryan itself has been rejected by Congress in amendments to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 68 the inde-

61 Id. at 180, 15 N.E.2d at 569. For discussion of the basis of the "independent duty" in
Westchester, see text accompanying notes 108-10 infra.
62 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
63 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
64 350 U.S. at 126, 134. The longshoreman's claim against the shipowner was grounded on
the two alternate theories of negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work and the
unseaworthiness doctrine. Id. at 127; see note 68 infrd.
65 350 U.S. at 130.
66 See id. at 131-35.
67 Id. at 130. In a dissenting opinion, however, Mr. Justice Black stated:
I think . . .this stevedoring company is being required to pay a $75,000 verdict "on
account of" injuries to an employee received in the line of that employee's duties.
...The employer has to pay more "on account of" an injury to his employee than
Congress said he should.
Id. at 139-41 (Black, J., dissenting).
68 See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
Pub.L.No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251-65 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (1976)),
among other important changes, eliminated the cause of action against the shipowner for unseaworthiness of the vessel, and prohibited indemnification of the vessel even if by express
contract. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976); see Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759,
768 (E. D. Pa. 1974); note 36 supra. The effect of the 1972 amendments has been ably discussed
in Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act: An Opportunity for Equitable Uniformity in Tripartite Industrial Accident

Litigation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587 (1974). For recent cases, see 2A A. LARSON,
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.43 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
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pendent duty theory enunciated therein has been applied to cases
arising under state compensation laws. 69
Primary-Secondary Liability
Where a statute, or a legal relationship between the parties, imposes a liability for the actions of"another upon a party not personally
at fault, the latter is considered "secondarily" liable for the negligence
of the former. 70 The liability of the secondarily liable party is merely
"imputed, vicarious or constructive." 71 An obligation is, therefore,
imposed upon the primarily liable party to indemnify the secondarily
liable party for losses occasioned by the former's negligence. 7 2 It is
in this situation that the strongest equitable claim to implied indemnification is presented. Furthermore, the negligent party has an independent duty to indemnify the party held liable. 73 A bailor, for
example, may be held vicariously liable for the active negligence of
an employer bailee. Where this occurs, the employer's duty to
indemnify the bailor is imposed by law.
In Baugh v. Rogers, 74 the plaintiff employee was injured in the
course of her employment due to her employer's negligent operation
of a motor vehicle owned by a third party. 75 Since the workers'
compensation law was the employee's exclusive remedy against the
employer, she could not recover damages from him. 76 The owner of
the vehicle, however, was held to be vicariously liable to her by stat69 E.g., Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 323, 144 N.W.2d 303,
309 (1966); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 273 Or. 162, 166-67,
539 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1975). It has also been applied in cases'arising under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1976). See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v.
United States, 493 F.2d 881, 883-87 (3d Cir. 1974).
70 See, e.g., Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325, 328, 77 A.2d 368, 370, 371
(1951); O'Donnell, supra note 49, at 275.
71 Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 489, 378 A.2d 53, 62 (Law Div.
1977).
72 Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 79-80, 159 A.2d 97, 109-10
(1960); Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937); O'Donnell, supra note 53, at 275. The Restatement of
Restitution provides: "A person who, without personal fault, has become subject to tort liability
for the unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another, is entitled to indemnity from the other
for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such liability." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937).

73 See Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368, 369-70
(10th Cir. 1954).
74 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944).
75 Id. at 204, 148 P.2d at 636. Plaintiff was attempting to close an office window from the
outside when she was struck by a car driven by her employer. Id.
76 Id. at 207, 148 P.2d at 637-38.
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ute. 77 Under the law governing bailments, the bailor was entitled to
recover from the negligent bailee the amount of any judgment against
the former which was based on the imputed negligence of the latter. 78 The California supreme court held that the relationship between the employee and the bailee employer "isimmaterial in an
action between the bailor and the bailee, based exclusively upon their
79
independent, correlative rights and obligations."
In the absence of a statutory obligation, a "special legal relationship" may create a secondary liability and a corresponding independent duty to indemnify. 80 For example, a lessor, as owner, may be
held secondarily liable for an injury to an employee caused by the
employer's negligence with regard to the leased object. The employer
would then have an independent duty to indemnify the third party
lessor. 81

In Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp. (Ruvolo i),82 the third
party, who manufactured, owned, and leased to the employer the
77Id. at 214, 148 P.2d at 641. Other courts have held that where the defendant's liability is
merely vicarious, the defenses available to the party actually negligent are also available to the
defendant, and, therefore, a suit by the employee against a party vicariously liable for the
employer's negligence would be barred by the workers' compensation law. See Rauch v. Jones,
4 N.Y.2d 592, 596, 152 N.E.2d 63, 65, 176 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (1958); Naso v. Lafata, 4 N.Y.2d
585, 589-91, 152 N.E.2d 59, 61-62, 176 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625-27 (1958); Castle v. North End
Contracting Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 8, 10-11, 248 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1964). See also Dale v.
Whiteman, 388 Mich. 698, 710, 202 N.W.2d 797, 802-03 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Ironically, the law in both California and New York has since been changed. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3864 (West 1971); N.Y. Civ. PnRAc. LAW §§ 1401-1402 (McKinney 1976). For discussion of
the California and New York laws, see note 47 supra and notes 241-50 infra and accompanying
text. Before the changes in these laws, a New York employee could have received only workers'
compensation when the third party's liability was vicarious and the employer was negligent.
However, in California an employee could have recovered from the third party, who would
have been indemnified by the employer, and the employee would have received common law
damages.
78 24 Cal. 2d at 215-16, 148 P.2d at 642.
79Id. at 216, 148 P.2d at 642. For similar fact situations and holdings, varying only in that
the employer's liability was for the negligence of an employee in injuring a fellow employee, see
generally Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kohn Bros. Tobacco, 141 Conn. 539, 107 A.2d
406 (1954); Dale v. Whiteman, 388 Mich. 698, 202 N.W.2d 797 (1972); Lunderberg v. Bierman,
241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954). Cf. Carneiro v. Alfred B. King Co., 347 A.2d 120, 122
(Super. Ct. 1975) (bailor employer held liable for indemnity to bailee based upon an independent duty to warrant the fitness of the goods supplied). In California, however, a statutory
provision has been enacted, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3864 (West 1971), which prohibits recovery of
indemnity from the employer in the absence of an express contract.
80 See Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 489, 378 A.2d 53, 62 (Law Div.
1977); Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 133 N.J. Super. 362, 368, 336 A.2d 508, 511 (Law
Div. 1975).
81 E.g., Stevens v. Polinsky, 341 A.2d 25, 28-29 (Super. Ct. 1974). See also Sunspan Eng'r
& Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4, 5-7 (Fla. 1975).
82 133 N.J. Super. 362, 336 A.2d 508 (Law Div. 1975).
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steel strapping machine which injured the plaintiff employee, alleged
that the employer was solely negligent. 8 3 In denying a motion to
dismigs the third party complaint against the employer,8 4 the trial
court held that there was "a sufficient special legal relationship to
create duties between" the employer and the third party which justified a claim against the employer for indemnification. 8 5 However,
in Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp. (Ruvolo II),86 in which there

was a finding that both the employer and the third party were negligent,8 7 judgment was entered for the employer.8 8 The Ruvolo II
court agreed that the lessor-lessee relationship was a sufficient special
legal relationship, 8 9 but held that, since the third party was also negligent, he was not entitled to indemnification from the negligent
employer. 90
An agency relationship has also been recognized as a sufficient
special legal relationship. In Hagen v. Koerner,9 1 the executrix of a
fellow employee brought a wrongful death action against Koerner. 92
Koerner than filed a complaint against the employer, denying that he
was personally negligent and alleging that he had been following his
employer's instructions and was acting as his employer's agent. 9 3 The
New Jersey court held that Koerner was entitled to indemnity from

his employer where he was "compelled to pay for doing something in
good faith, without knowledge of its tortious character, and not illegal, which he was ordered and directed to do by his employer." ' 94
Since the claim for indemnity was based on the agency relationship
between the employer and the third party, Koerner, it was not
barred by the workers' compensation law. 95
83

Id. at 364-65, 336 A.2d at 509.

84 Id.
85

Id.

at 368, 336 A.2d at 511.

139 N.J. Super. 578, 354 A.2d 685 (Law Div. 1976).
87 Id. at 582-83, 354 A.2d at 688.
88 Id. at 587, 354 A.2d at 690.
89 Id. at 583-84, 354 A.2d at 688.
8"

90 Id. at 584, 354 A.2d at 689. "An agreement to indemnify an indemnitee against his own

negligence must be intended and clearly expressed." Id.; see Rommell v. United States Steel
Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 30, 43, 168 A.2d 437, 443 (App. Div.), certif denied, 34 N.J. 580, 170
A.2d 544 (1961).
91 64 N.J. Super. 580, 166 A.2d 784 (App. Div. 1960).
92 Id. at 582, 166 A.2d at 785.
93 See id.
94 Id. at 586-88, 166 A.2d at 787-88.
95 Id. at 588, 166 A.2d at 788. The court explained:
More unjustifiable than extending the employer's liability, by express or implied
agreement to indemnify, beyond his responsibility under the Workmen's Compensation Law, would be the anomalous result of requiring the co-employee to shoul-
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Contractual Relationship
Some courts allow indemnification based upon a contractual relationship between the employer and the third party. 9 6 Where the
contract imposes on the employer an independent duty to the third
party, upon a breach of that duty a further duty to indemnify the
third party for resulting losses is implied. 9 7 In a few cases, the duty
breached by the employer was expressly imposed by the contract. 98
More often, the only duty to the third party breached by the
employer was implied, usually the duty to perform the contract safely
and with reasonable care. 99
In Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 100 the
Supreme Court held that a duty to load the cargo "properly and
safely" 101 was implied from the stevedoring contract. Upon breach of
this "warranty of workmanlike service,"102 a duty to indemnify the
shipowner was implied. Ryan is the leading decision allowing indemnity on this contractual theory. 10 3 Some courts have followed the

der the employer's obligation because he was obedient to his employer's instructions.
Id.
96 E.g., Whitmarsh v. Durastone Co., 122 F. Supp. 806, 811 (D.R.I. 1954); Blackford v.
Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 850-52, 118 N.W.2d 559, 562--63 (1962); Montoya
v. Greenway Aluminum Co., 10 Wash. App. 630, 635-36, 519 P.2d 22, 26 (1974). Contra,
Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1111 (5th Cir. 1970);
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230 Md. 584, 587, 590, 187
A.2d 864, 865, 867 (1963); Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137,
141, 143, 353 P.2d 358, 361, 362 (1960).
17 See McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788,
796 (Mo. 1959); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.43(d).
98 E.g., McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788,
791-92, 794 (Mo. 1959) (contract specifically required employer to warn employee of hazards,
and employer failed to do so); see General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780, 786-87 (4th Cir.
1959) (employer breached statutes and regulations, and court held that those provisions formed
part of contract between employer and third party); Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d
218, 222 (2d Cir. 1941) (employer breached statutory duty; third party had no "active participation in the wrongful acts").
99 E.g., Whitmarsh v. Durastone Co., 122 F.Supp. 806, 809 (D.R.I. 1954); Blackford v.
Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 850, 118 N.W.2d 559, 562 (1962); Wentworth
Hotel, Inc. v. F.A. Gray, Inc., 110 N.H. 458, 459, 272 A.2d 583, 584 (1970).
1- 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
101 Id.
102
103

at 133.

Id.

However, the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976), overturned Ryan and destroyed the shipowner's right to
indemnity from the stevedore. See note 68 supra.
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Ryan rationale in interpreting state compensation laws; 104 others
10 5
have rejected this approach.
The interrelationship of tort and contract in this situation is
somewhat confusing. In order to justify indemnity, the employer
must have been primarily responsible for the injury, 10 6 in addition to
having breached an independent duty to the third party arising out of
10 7
their contractual relationship.
Direct Tort Liability
In the leading case of Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester
County Small Estates Corp.,1081 frequently cited for the independent
104 E.g.,

General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780, 788-91 (4th Cir. 1959) (Tennessee

law); Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 852, 118 N.W.2d 559, 563--64
(1962); McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788,
795-96 (Mo. 1959); Wentworth Hotel, Inc. v. F.A. Gray, Inc., 110 N.H. 458, 460-61, 272 A.2d
583, 585 (1970).
105 E.g., Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1107-11 (5th
Cir. 1970) (Mississippi law); General Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89, 91-93
(5th Cir. 1968) (Louisiana law); Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., Inc., 518 P.2d
65, 67-69 (Alas. 1974); Bagwell v. South La. Elec. Coop. Ass'n, 228 So.2d 555, 561 (La. Ct. of
App. 1969); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230 Md. 584,
588-90, 187 A.2d 864, 865-67 (1963); Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67
N.M. 137, 141-43, 353 P.2d 358, 361-62 (1960); Grede Foundries, Inc. v. Price Erecting Co.,
38 Wis. 2d 502, 507-08, 157 N.W.2d 559, 561-62 (1968). The New Jersey courts apparently
have not yet addressed the question.
106 E.g., 'Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 126, 134-35 (1956);
General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780, 787 (4th Cir. 1959); American Dist. Tel. Co. v.
Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 947-48 (8th Cir. 1950); Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218,
220, 222 (2d Cir. 1941); Whitmarsh v. Durastone Co., 122 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (D.R.I. 1954);
Oaklawn Jockey Club, Inc. v. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 251 Ark. 1100, 1101, 477 S.W.2d 477,
478 (1972); Boston v. Old Orchard Business Dist., Inc., 26 I1. App. 2d 324, 326, 168 N.E.2d
52, 54 (App. Ct. 1960); Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 Il1. App. 2d 534, 536-39, 165
N.E.2d 346, 348-49 (App. Ct. 1960); Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845,
852, 118 N.W.2d 559, 563--64 (1962); McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Mo. 1959).
In each of these cases, contract indemnity was granted in a situation in which the employer
was either in control of the instrumentality which injured the employee, in control of the
employee's actions with regard to that instrumentality, or both. Therefore, in those jurisdictions
which recognize the right of a passive wrongdoer to recover from an active wrongdoer, a claim
for indemnity under this theory may also have been stated. Most courts hold, however, that
recovery is not available from an employer on this ground in the absence of a contractual
relationship or other basis for an independent duty owed by the employer to the third party.
See notes 111-18 infra and accompanying text.
107 The contractual relationship between the parties provided an independent duty justification for recovery of indemnity in spiteof the workers' compensation bar. E.g., Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129-31 (1956); Whitmarsh v. Durastone Co., 122
F. Supp. 806, 811 (D.R.I. 1954); Wentworth Hotel, Inc. v. F.A. Gray, Inc., 110 N.H. 458,
460, 272 A.2d 583, 585 (1970).
108 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938); see text accompanying notes 57-61.
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duty theory, the independent duty was, uniquely, not grounded upon
any contractual relationship. In breaking a gas pipe for which the
third party was responsible, the employer committed a negligent tort
directly against the third party itself which also resulted in the death
of its own employee. 10 9 It was this tort relationship between the
employer and the third party which made the duty to indemnify independent.110
The Active-Passive Theory
When the only relationship between the parties is that of joint
torifeasors, a claim for indemnity must be based squarely upon the
theory that an "actively" negligent tortfeasor has an implied obligation
to indemnify a "passively" negligent tortfeasor. 1 11 New Jersey has
rejected the active-passive theory. 1 1 2 In Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc.
v. Gaseteria,113 the New Jersey supreme court stated that indemnity
278 N.Y. at 177, 15 N.E.2d at 567.
110 Id. at 179, 15 N.E.2d at 568. For the court's explanation of the independent duty, see
text accompanying notes 60-61 supra. But see Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 184 Md. 674, 39
A.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1944). In Baltimore Transit, the employer's truck collided with the third
party's streetcar. id. at 676, 39 A.2d at 859. Since the third party claimed that the sole cause of
the accident was the negligence of the employer's agent, id. at 677, 39 A.2d at 859, it is at least
arguable that the employer had committed a tort directly against the third party. The court,
however, did not raise this question, and held that the third party was entitled to neither
indemnity nor contribution by virtue of the workers' compensation law. Id. at 681, 39 A.2d at
861.
"I See Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1974); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 489, 378 A.2d 53, 62 (Law Div. 1977). There has been
substantial disagreement whether this relationship is sufficient to justify indemnity, and, if so,
the proper scope of application of the theory. Santisteven, 506 F.2d at 1218; Iowa Power &
Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 324, 327, 144 N.W.2d 303, 309, 311 (1966);
Davis, supra note 16, at 542-43.
As described by one court:
These cases frequently characterize the negligence of the indemnitor as "active," "primary," or "positive" and the negligence of the indemnitee as "passive,"
"secondary," or "negative." Such characterizations have been criticized as being artificial, lacking objective criteria desirable for predictability in the law, and various
rationales have been proposed for allowance of indemnity in such cases. Thus, indemnification of a concurrently negligent tortfeasor is said to be based upon a disparity of duties of care owed by the tortfeasors to the injured party, the doctrine of
last clear chance or discovered peril, a disparity of gravity of the fault of the
tortfeasors, or a combination of these.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379, 399 (9th Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 951 (1964).
The confusion in the underlying law is extensive, but the discussion here is necessarily
limited to the issue of the effect of workers' compensation on this type of indemnity where it
otherwise would be allowed.
112 Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, 32 N.J. 55, 81, 159 A.2d 97, 110-11 (1960).
11332 N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97 (1960).
109
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between joint tortfeasors based upon this theory was "completely unjustified," since New Jersey permits contribution between such joint
tortfeasors. 114 In those few jurisdictions which do allow indemnity
upon this basis, the workers' compensation exclusivity provision has
generally been held to be a bar to recovery. 115
The basis for recovery of implied indemnity under the activepassive theory is the joint liability of tortfeasors to the injured
party. 11 6 However, because of the workers' compensation exclusive
liability provision, the employer is not liable in tort to the employee,
and, therefore, cannot be jointly liable with a third party. 117 It is for
this reason that most courts hold that the third party cannot recover
indemnity from the employer where their relationship is merely that
of joint tortfeasors.118
114

Id.

115 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.44, at 14-394 to -395; e.g., Dawn v. Essex Conveyors,

Inc., 498 F.2d 921, 924-25 (6th Cir. 1974) (Tennessee law); Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v.
Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 1970) (Mississippi law).
116 Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1974); see Slatter' v.
Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951); Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 670, 73 S.E.2d
886, 892 (1953); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 489, 378 A.2d 53, 62 (Law
Div. 1977). This is, of course, also the basis for a claim for contribution. Lovette v. Lloyd, 236
N.C. at 670, 73 S.E.2d at 892; Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559,
571, 75 S.E.2d 768, 776 (1953); see notes 154-57 infra and accompanying text.
117 Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1974); see United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379, 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Arcell v.
Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 489, 378 A.2d 53, 62 (Law Div. 1977).
11 See Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1974); Dawn v.
Essex Conveyors, Inc., 498 F.2d 921, 924-25 (6th Cir. 1974); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,
335 F.2d 379, 402-04 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186
F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 323,
144 N.W.2d 303, 309 (1966); Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 670-71, 73 S.E.2d 886, 892-93
(1953); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 571, 75 S.E.2d 768, 776
(1953); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 437-38, 119 A.2d 172,
182-83 (App. Div. 1955); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 489, 378 A.2d 53,
62 (Law Div. 1977).
In Slattery, Judge Learned Hand reasoned as follows:
[W]e shall assume that, when the indemnitor and indemnitee are both liable to the
injured person, it is the law of New Jersey that, regardless of any other relation
between them, the difference in gravity of their faults may be great enough to
throw the whole loss upon one. We cannot, however, agree that that result is rationally possible except upon the assumption that both parties are liable to the same
person for the joint wrong. If so, when one of the two is not so liable, the right of
the other to indemnity must be found in rights and liabilities arising out of some
other legal transaction between the two. ...
... [T]here is nobody of sure authorty for saying that differences in the degrees of fault between two tortfeasors will without more strip one of them, if he is
an employer, of the protection of a compensation act; and we are at a loss to see
any tenable principle which can support such a result.
186 F.2d at 139.
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Nevertheless, a few courts have appeared to require an employer
to indemnify a third party on the ground that the employer's negligence was active, while the third party's was merely passive. 119 In
some of these cases there was also a contractual relationship between
120
the parties upon which the indemnity might have been based.
American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson,121 decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, is a good example of such a
case. In Kittleson, the court first asserted that the third party had
stated a cause of action for indemnity, since the parties were not in
pari delicto and under Iowa law the primarily liable employer was
obligated to indemnify the secondarily liable third party.' 22 The
Kittleson court then argued that the workers' compensation law did not
abrogate the right to indemnity.' 2 3 The court concluded with a discussion of the independent duty theory of Westchester Lighting Co.
v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp. 124 In cases similar to
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, a commercial airliner owned by United Air Lines
collided with an Air Force jet fighter, killing all on board both planes. Among the passengers on
the United Air Lines jet were seven civilian government employees traveling in the line of
duty. 335 F.2d at 384. Both United Air Lines and the United States were held to have been
negligent. Id. at 388-90, 392. In regard to the passengers who were not government
employees, the court said that "[in view of the disparity of duties, the clear disparity of culpability, the likely operation of the last clear chance doctrine and all the surrounding circumstances," United Air Lines and the United States were not in pari delicto and "there is such
difference in the contrasted character of fault as to warrant indemnity in favor of United ....
335 F.2d at 402. However, in regard to the government employees, "the exclusive liability
provision removed the underlying liability necessary for indemnity." 335 F.2d at 403. See also
Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co., 302 F.2d 431, 434 (1962); Brown v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1954); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784, 792
(3d Cir. 1953); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322, 323-24 (2d Cir.
1950); Husted v. Consumers Power Co., 376 Mich. 41, 50-51, 135 N.W.2d 370, 374 (1965).
119 American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 951-52 (8th Cir. 1950); Trail Builders
Supply Co. v. Reagan, 255 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1970); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 111. 2d 273,
288-89, 226 N.E.2d 630, 640 (1967); Jones v. McDougal-Hartman Co., 115 II1. App. 2d 403,
406, 253 N.E.2d 581, 583 (App. Ct. 1969); Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 111.App. 2d
534, 537-39, 165 N.E.2d 346, 348-49 (App. Ct. 1960); Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Jackson County
Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d 788, 789-90 (Ky. 1968).
120 E.g., Jones v. McDougal-Hartman Co., 115 111.App. 2d 403, 406, 253 N.E.2d 581, 583
(App. Ct. 1969); Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 I11. App. 2d 534, 537-44, 165 N.E.2d
346, 348-52 (App. Ct. 1960),
121 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950).
122 Id. at 951-52. While the opinion was couched in terms of primary and secondary negligence, the rationale was in fact what is now more frequently termed "active-passive" liability.
123 Id. at 952-53.
124 Id. at 954; see text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
Since Kittleson was decided by a federal court, later interpretations of Kittleson by the Iowa
state courts are interesting. In Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 118
N.W.2d 559 (1962), the court stated that the Eighth Circuit decision in Kittleson was
sound and in line with the better reasoning on the proper construction of our
Workmen's Compensation statute. The cross-petition is not based on a claim of
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Kittleson, it should be recognized that the courts are confronted with
two distinct problems. The first question is when one wrongdoer is
entitled to indemnity from another. Second is the question of when
such indemnity can be recovered despite the fact that the indemnitor
is the employer of the injured party, i.e., when the liability "is not on
account of the injury." 125 Some courts have emphasized the relative
degrees of negligence of the parties which created a liability for indemnity, rather than the relationship between the parties which
made the duty to indemnify independent and thus not barred by the
workers' compensation exclusive liability provision.
There are a small number of cases which have, in the absence of
any contractual or other relationship between the parties, allowed the
third party to recover indemnity from the employer based solely
upon the active-passive theory.1 26 A few cases have apparently considered any right to indemnity to be independent of the employee's
action against the third party. 127 Other courts have required the
negligence of the employer which injured the employee, but upon a breach of an
implied contract to do the work safely.
Id. at 855, 118 N.W.2d at 565. Four years later, in Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr.
Co., 259 Iowa 314, 144 N.W.2d 303 (1966), the same court stated that Kittleson "permitted the
action for indemnity to stand even though its basis was primary as opposed to secondary negligence. The decision appears to be contrary to our analysis ....."Id. at 324, 144 N.W.2d at
309. This court, while approving indemnity based upon a contractual relationship, apparently
failed to recognize that such an independent contractual duty was arguably present in Kittleson.
Id. at 325, 144 N.W.2d at 309-10. It does seem clear that in Iowa an action for indemnity based
solely upon active-passive negligence would be barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity
provision. See Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 534 F.2d 775, 782 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976).
Similarly, in Rich v. United States, 177 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1949), the court stated that the
third party could recover from a primarily liable employer. Id. at 691. As in Kittleson, there was
a contractual relationship between the parties. Id. at 689. Furthermore, the court noted that
the employer had an "independent duty" to indemnify the third party based upon the
Westchester theory. Id. at 691.
Several courts have pointed out that these cases can be explained on the basis of the
contractual relationship of the parties. Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951);
Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 567-68, 75 S.E.2d 768, 774
(1953); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 437, 119 A.2d 172, 182
(App. Div. 1955).
Although the courts in Jones v. McDougal-Hartman Co., 115 I11.
App. 2d 403, 253 N.E.2d
581 (App. Ct. 1969), and Moroni v.-Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 111.
App. 2d 534, 165 N.E.2d
346 (App. Ct. 1960), emphasized the passive character of the third party's negligence, the decisions could have been based upon the contractual relationship of the parties. Jones, 115 I11.
App. 2d at 406, 253 N.E.2d at 583; Moroni, 24 111.
App. 2d at 537, 165 N.E.2d at 348.
125 2A A.

LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.44, at 14-394.

Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill.
2d 273, 288-89, 226 N.E.2d 630, 640 (1967); Kentucky Utils.
Co. v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d 788, 789-90 (Ky. 1968); see Coates
v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779, 783--84 (D.D.C. 1951). But see Slattery v. Marra
Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951).
127 Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779, 783-84 (D.D.C. 1951) (dictum);
Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d 788, 789-90 (Ky.
126
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employer to indemnify the third party without characterizing it as an
28
independent duty.'

1968); see Ham v. Standard Eng'r Co., 416 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (D.S.D. 1976), quoted in text
accompanying notes 140-41 infra.
In Kentucky Utils. Co., the third party and the employer were utility companies who maintained electric lines in proximity to one another. 438 S.W.2d at 789. The employer, in bringing
its line too close to the third party's in violation of safety rules adopted by the Public Service
Commission of Kentucky, was alleged to have been primarily at fault. Id. The employee was
electrocuted when the two lines came into contact. Id. The third party settled a claim with the
representative of the deceased employee, and claimed a right to indemnity from the employer
on the ground that its negligence was merely passive "in failing to inspect, discover, and remedy the hazardous condition created by" the employer. Id. The court held "that the commonlaw right of indemnity is a jural right which existed prior to the adoption of our Constitution
and may not be abolished by the General Assembly.'" Id. at 790. Although the court cited
Westchester for its independent duty theory, the court did not explain the way in which an
independent duty was present in the instant case. Id.
In Coates, there was no contractual relationship between the parties. After denying the
third party contribution from the employer, the court said that if the third party had claimed
indemnity from the employer "on the theory that the latter was the active wrongdoer and was
primarily liable for the injury sustained by plaintiff, then the cross-complaint would have been
for breach of an independent duty ....
namely, an implied agreement of indemnity." 95 F.
Supp. at 783-84 (footnote omitted).
128 Miller v. DeWitt, 37 I11. 2d 273, 288-89, 226 N.E.2d 630, 640 (1967); see Trail Builders
Supply Co. v. Reagan, 255 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1970).
In Miller, the third party was an architect who had supervised the work of the contractoremployer. 37 I11.2d at 275, 226 N.E.2d at 633. The principal issue confronted by the court was
whether the architect was liable for failing to stop the contractor's activities which resulted in
injury to the employee. Id. at 276-87, 226 N.E.2d at 633-39. The dissent forcefully argued that
the architect should not have been liable. Id. at 292-95, 226 N.E.2d at 642-43. The core of the
majority's discussion of the indemnity problem was as follows:
The argument of the contractor is not without merit, for, in consideration of
limited liability under the workmen's compensation laws, employers have given up
many of their prior rights. However, we feel that the argument in favor of allowing
a third party who was not actively negligent to obtain indemnification from an
employer who was actively negligent is the better view.
Id. at 288-89, 226 N.E.2d at 640. This case is interesting because it brings into sharp focus the
fact that the employer can only be liable for common law damages if the third party is initially
held liable to the employee.
In Trail Builders, the third party was the manufacturer and the employer was the purchaser of the machine which injured the employee. 255 So. 2d at 482. However, the court's
language indicated no reliance on this relationship to remove the bar to the employer's liability:
The statute affects only the rights and remedies of the employer and the employee.
A passive tortfeasor's direct common law right of indemnity against the active
tortfeasor is not mentioned. If it had been the legislative intent to abolish such
right, it should have been spelled out with specificity and particularity ....
Id. at 485 (footnote omitted). Indemnity was justified, in the view of the court, based upon the
passive character of the third party's wrong as contrasted with the active character of the
employer's wrong. Id.; see Sunspan Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310
So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975), discussed in notes 370-80 infra and accompanying text.
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The Buyer-Seller Relationship
When the third party manufactures the machine or other product
purchased by the employer which injures the employee, the courts
analyze the manufacturer's claim for indemnity from the employer in
varying ways. Elements of state law other than the workers' compensation exclusive liability provision are often ultimately determinative
of the manufacturer's right to indemnity. 129 Additionally, the cases
discuss different potential justifications for allowing implied indemnity
despite the workers' compensation bar.
In an Oregon case, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Kaiser Gypsum Co.,' 3 0 the employer ran initial testing of the
machine supplied by the third party without using the required
guard, resulting in an injury to the employee. 131 The opinion of' the
state supreme court contained an extensive review of the authorities,
most of which allowed recovery of indemnity based upon a contractual relationship between the parties. 132 The court held that the
employer had an independent duty to the third party to use reasonable care, and a claim for indemnity based upon a breach of that duty
was therefore not barred by the workers' compensation law. 133 In
order to support the claim for indemnity, the court stated that the
third party was also required to show that the employer was primarily
13 4
responsible for the injury.
The factual situation in Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan,135 a
Florida case, was similar. In Trail Builders, the employer had re129 E.g., William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 115 N.H. 632, 634, 348 A.2d

716, 718 (1975). The New Hampshire court held that since the purchaser-employer owed the
manufacturer no duty of any kind there was no basis for indemnity. Id.
130 273 Or. 162, 539 P.2d 1065 (1975).
131 Id. at 164, 539 P.2d at 1066.
132 Id. at 167-76, 539 P.2d at 1067-71. The court discussed over two dozen relevant cases,
but only one of them, A.O. Smith Corp. v. Associated Sales & Bag Co., 16 Wis. 2d 145, 113
N.W.2d 562 (1962), involved a buyer-seller relationship. In A.O. Smith, the court had held that
the workers' compensation exclusivity provision immunized the employer from any liability to

the supplier. Id. at 145-50, 113 N.W.2d at 563-65.
133 273 Or. at 166, 539 P.2d at 1067. The court concluded that "when the injury to the
employee for which the third party was held liable resulted from the breach of an independent
duty owed to the third party by the employer," the third party could recover indemnity from
the employer. Id. at 177, 539 P.2d at 1072. "This duty," the court stated, "will be implied by
law from the relationship between the employer and the party seeking indemnity." Id. The
court appears to have assumed that the buyer-seller relationship was not distinguishable from
other types of contractual relationships which have been held to give rise to an independent
duty to use reasonable care. See id. at 166-67, 539 P.2d at 1067. The court simply stated that if
the test during which the employee was injured was conducted by the employer alone, rather
than jointly with the third party supplier, then the employer owed the supplier "an independent duty of-care." Id. at 177, 539 P.2d at 1072. But see note 146 infra and accompanying text.
134 Id. at 178, 539 P.2d at 1073.
5 235 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1970).
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moved a safety bar from the equipment purchased from the third
party, and the employee was injured as a result.' 3 6 In contrast to
Kaiser Gypsum's justification of indemnity upon the basis of a contractual relationship, the Supreme Court of Florida rested its decision
to allow indemnity squarely upon the right of a passive wrongdoer to
recover from an active wrongdoer.137 The court argued that the
statute did not manifest a clear legislative intent to abrogate this right
to indemnity. 13 8
Similarly, in Harn v.Standard Engineering Co.,' 3 9 the district
court for the district of South Dakota argued that "an indemnity claim
is not derivative of' the employees' claim. Rather, indemnity is based
on a set of facts warranting a conclusion that the indemnitor owes a
distinct obligation or duty to the indemnitee."' 140 The court noted
that "[t]his obligation exists separate and apart from any liability
which the employer as indemnitor might have had to his injured
employee."' 14 1 Under South Dakota law the claim for indemnity
could be based upon the right of "one who is without personal fault"
to recover "from another who breached a duty of care to the injured
person" 142 -in other words, the right of one who was merely vicariously or secondarily liable to recover from one who was primarily
liable. The court held that the allegations of the complaint were suffi143
cient to state a claim for indemnity.
Differences in the underlying state law governing indemnity may
account for the variation in the analyses of the buyer-seller situation.
The New Jersey courts, however, have not accepted the theories
upon which these courts have permitted the manufacturer to recover
indemnity ftrom the employer. In a recent New Jersey case, Arcell v.

1-3 Id. at 485.

131Id. The court stated that the "[e]mployer now cannot be heard to say that his active,
culpably wrong act may fall upon another, a passive wrongdoer, in the form of money damages
fbr which he could not be liable in indemnity." Id.

1a8id.; see note 128 supra. The court also argued that it would be unjust to immunize an
actively negligent employer from liability for indemnity to a passively negligent third party. 235
So. 2d at 485. The court implied that no right to indemnity from the third party was abrogated
by the workers' compensation law. Id.; see notes 367-80 infra and accompanying text.
139 416 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.D. 1976).
140 Id. at 1170.
141 1d.
142 1d.
143 Id. The employee had lost his left arm in a grain augur. Id. at 1168. An action was
brought against the manufacturer, id., which in turn alleged that it was not negligent, and that

the employer had negligently altered the grain augur. Id. at 1169-70. The employer moved to
dismiss the action against it. Id. at 1169. The district court dismissed the portion of the com-

plaint seeking contribution, but not the portion seeking indemnity. Id. at 1170.
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Ashland Chemical Co., 14 4 the court found that "[tihe fact that the
manufacturer and employer may have entered into a sales contract
[was] not sufficient to establish that type of relationship from which
an implied obligation to indemnify the third party may arise." 145 The
court believed that indemnity should not be allowed based upon this
relationship because "first, the duty to use a third party's product to
avoid unreasonable risks of harm [was] owed to the employee, not the
third party." 146 Second, the liability would only be imposed upon
the third party for its own negligence.1 4 7 If the negligence of the
employer was an intervening cause of the injury, 1 48 this would be a
defense to the original action against the manufacturer rather than a
basis of an action for indemnity. 1 49 Furthermore, a manufacturer
would not be held liable to an employee, even on a claim of strict
liability, if it was free from personal fault. 150 Under New Jersey law
a party who is not free from personal fault has no right to implied
5
indemnity.'1
CONTRIBUTION

Contribution is grounded on equitable principles: "[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire
burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintention144 152 N.J. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (Law Div. 1977).
145Id. at 490, 378 A.2d at 63.
146 Id. at 492, 378 A.2d at 64; see Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th
Cir. 1974); William H. Field Co. v.Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 115 N.H. 632, 634, 348 A.2d 716,
718 (1975). In William H. Field, the court commented that "[n]o duty flows upstream from the
purchaser to the manufacturer." 115 N.H. at 634, 348 A.2d at 718. Professor Larson took the
same position, arguing:
[Wihen a purchaser buys a product, does he make an implied contract with the
manufacturer to use the goods in such a way as not to bring liability upon the
manufacturer? This would be stretching the concept of contract out of all relation to
reality.
2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.44, at 14-402.
147 152 N.J. Super. at 492-93, 378 A.2d at 64; see Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 41 11. App. 3d
483, 489, 355 N.E.2d 145, 151 (App. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 70 111.2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1978);
William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 115 N.H. 632, 634, 348 A.2d 716, 718 (1975).
I" See also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 181-82, 386 A.2d 816, 830
(1978).
149152 N.J. Super. at 490, 493, 378 A.2d at 63-64; see Bertone v. Turco Prods., Inc., 252
F.2d 726, 729 (3d Cir. 1958) (New Jersey law); Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 41 I11. App. 3d 483,
489, 355 N.E.2d 145, 152 (App. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 70 I11.
2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1978); William
H. Field v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 115 N.H. 632, 634, 348 A.2d 716, 718 (1975).
150152 N.J. Super. at 490, 378 A.2d at 62--63. Some courts have held that the fault of a
strictly liable party is qualitatively active. See id. at 490, 378 A.2d at 63.
151 Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 79-80, 159 A.2d 97, 109-10
(1960); Arcell, 152 N.J. Super. at 489, 378 A.2d at 62.
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ally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone .... " 152 Contribution allows the party compelled to pay for an injury to recover a
share of the loss from another wrongdoer. 153 The statutory language
varies, but the right can usually only be asserted against a "joint
tortfeasor"154 or a party "jointly or severally liable in tort,"155 i.e.,
156
someone jointly liable to the original plaintiff.
The overwhelming majority of courts have argued that since the
employer cannot be liable in tort for an injury to an employee, he has
no joint or common liability with the third party and, therefore, cannot be liable to the third party for contribution. 1 5 7 In Newport Air
152 W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 50, at 307. The purpose of contribution is to achieve "a
sharing of the common responsibility according to equity and natural justice." Sattelberger v.
Telep, 14 N.J. 353, 367-68, 102 A.2d 577, 584 (1954); see Comment, supra note 19, at 79.
'53 See generally Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 1170 (1941); James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54
HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1941); Leflar, supra note 16, at 131-46; Note, Adjusting Losses Among
Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L. J. 964 (1959). For a discussion of
New Jersey law, see generally Orlando, The Operation of the 'Joint Tortfeasors Contribution
Law" in New Jersey, 22 INS. COUNSEL J. 480 (1955).
154 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-2 (West 1952).
155E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1, -2 (West 1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 (1969 repl.
& Cum. Supp. 1977); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1(a) (1955 rev.).
15'See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 875(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 875(a) provides:
"Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort
action there shall be a right of contribution among them ... ."Id.
157 E.g., Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1975); Murray v. United States,
405 F.2d 1361, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1968); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d
322, 323 (2d Cir. 1950); Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1946), revd on
other grounds sub nom. American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); Ham v.
Standard Eng'r Co., 416 F. Supp. 1168, 1169 (D.S.D. 1976); Coats v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
95 F. Supp. 779, 781-82 (D.D.C. 1951); A.A. Equipment, Inc. v. Farmoil, Inc., 31 Conn.
Supp. 322, 324, 330 A.2d 99, 100 (Super. Ct. 1974); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr.
Co., 259 Iowa 314, 319, 144 N.W.2d 303, 306 (1966); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin
Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d 179, 184-85 (Ky. 1955); Hebert v. Blankenship, 187 So. 2d 798, 801
(La. Ct. of App. 1966); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 679, 39 A.2d 858, 860
(1944); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westerlind, 373 N.E.2d 957, 958-59 (Mass. 1978); Husted v.
Consumers Power Co., 376 Mich. 41, 56, 135 N.W.2d 370, 377 (1965); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 374-75, 104 N.W.2d 843, 849 (1960); William H.
Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 115 N.H. 632, 634-35, 348 A.2d 716, 718 (1975); Arcell
v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 483-85, 378 A.2d 53, 59-60 (Law Div. 1977) (also
stating that Comparative Negligence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West Cum. Supp.
1978-1979), failed to remove this bar against recovery of contribution from employer); Farren v.
New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 31 N.J. Super. 356, 360-62, 106 A.2d 752, 754-55 (App. Div.
1954); Cacchillo v., H. Leach Mach. Co., 111 R.I. 593, 596-97, 305 A.2d 541, 543 (1973); Britt
v. Buggs, 201 Wis. 533, 536, 230 N.W. 621, 622 (1930).
The argument that the third party and the employer have no common liability to the
employee has seldom been directly challenged. But see Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257
N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977). In Lambertson, the court indicated:
While there is no common liability to the employee in tort, both the employer and
the third party are nonetheless liable to the employee for his injuries; the employer

1978]

COMMENT

Park, Inc. v. United States, 158 the First Circuit stated that "[c]ontribution does not create direct liability in tort, each towards the
other, between two tortfeasors."159 The court took the position that
"the route to contribution must be via subrogation or assignment
based upon payment."160 Therefore, the court believed "that there
would be nothing to be subrogated to if' the other party claimed to be
a joint torifeasor, was never under liability to the injured party." 161
Two years after the passage of the New Jersey statute allowing
contribution between joint tortfeasors, 16 2 the appellate division, in
3 addressed the question
Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 16
of' whether an employer could be required to contribute in a suit
against a third party by an injured employee. The New Jersey statute
allowed contribution between joint tortfeasors, 164 defined as "two or
more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to
person or property." 165 The court stated that since the employee

through the fixed no-fault workers' compensation system and the third party
through the variable recovery available in a common law tort action.
Id. at 688 (emphasis in original); see text accompanying notes 212-16 infra. Under most formulations, however, joint liability "ii tort" is essential to a claim for contribution. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:53A-1, -2 (West 1952); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT 9 1(a) (1955
rev.).
Additionally, one of the primary reasons for allowing contribution is absent when the
employer's liability is regulated by the workers' compensation law. It has been pointed out that
contribution should be allowed in order to avoid forcing one party to bear the entire burden
merely because of "the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability
insurance, the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the
latter goes scot free." W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 50, at 307 (footnote omitted). Where the
employer is protected from suit, no choice of defendants based on these reasons is possible and
this justification for contribution is not present. Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419
F.2d 342, 347 (1st Cir. 1969) (Coffin, J., concurring); Cacchillo v. H. Leach Mach. Co., 111 R.I.
593, 597, 305 A.2d 541, 543 (1973).
At least one jurisdiction has denied recovery of contribution from an employer on grounds
other than the "no common liability" argument. Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259
A.2d 43 (Me. 1969). In Roberts, the courts presented the majority rule, id. at 47-48, but stated
that in Maine the right to contribution rests on equitable principles and not on common liability. Id. at 48. The court concluded that the equities supporting contribution did not outweigh
the legislative bar to recovery contained in the workers' compensation law. Id.
For a discussion of the minority rule, which allows a limited recovery of contribution, see
notes 196-220 infra and accompanying text.
158 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969).
159 Id. at 346.
160 Id. (footnote omitted).
1r- Id.
162 An Act Establishing the Right of Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 1952 N.J. Laws ch.
335, 1075-76 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5 (West 1952)).
163 31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (App. Div. 1954).
164 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-2 (West 1952).
165Id. § 2A:53A-1.
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could not sue the employer for the tort, the employer was not liable
in tort, and could not be liable for contribution. 1 66 Further, the
court reasoned that "the relative responsibilities of the [third party]
and of the employer . . . to the plaintiff were distinctly different." 167 Therefore, "there [was] no joint or several liability in tort of
those parties to the injured person, no equivalence of the monetary
responsibility of each to be divided into pro rata shares."1 68
In Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc.,1 69 a possible
challenge to the New Jersey rule denying contribution was raised
and, in dicta, rejected. In this case, an airplane owner was absolutely
liable for injuries caused by the collision of its airplane with a television tower. 170 The owner brought a third party suit for contribution
against another party which was allegedly negligent. 17 ' The New
Jersey supreme court rejected the argument "that the party seeking
contribution [must] be liable for the same tort as the party from
whom contribution is sought." 172 However, the court stated that
contribution would only be allowed where it would have the same
effect as an action brought by the injured party against both
wrongdoers. 173 The court thereby distinguished cases where the liability of one wrongdoer to the injured party was limited by an auto166 31 N.J. Super. at 360-61, 106 A.2d at 754-55.

In Arcell, the third parties argued that New Jersey's comparative contribution statute, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), overruled Farren. 152 N.J. Super. at
483-84, 378 A.2d at 59-60. The statute provides that "[any party who is so compelled to pay
more than such party's percentage share may seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors. "
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The Arcell court held that this
statute must be construed with reference to the definition of "joint tortfeasors" contained in the
contribution statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-1 (West 1952). 152 N.J. Super. at 484-85, 378
A.2d at 60. Therefore, the comparative negligence statute did not give a tortfeasor any new
right to contribution from a party not liable directly to the injured plaintiff. Id. The comparative
negligence statute modified the contribution statute only "by making the quantum of contribution dependent upon the percentage of negligence rather than the number of defendants." 152
N.J. Super. at 485, 378 A.2d at 60 (emphasis in original).
167 31 N.J. Super. at 361, 106 A.2d at 755.
168 Id.
169 32 N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97 (1960).
170 Id. at 64--65, 67-72, 159 A.2d at 101-06.
171 Id. at 65, 159 A.2d at 101.
172 Id. at 75, 159 A.2d at 107. Since the New Jersey contribution statute provided for contribution only "[w]here injury or damage is suffered . . . as a result of the wrongful act, neglect
or default of joint tortfeasors," N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:53A-3 (West 1952), the party from whom
contribution was sought argued that the airplane owner would not be entitled to the benefits of
the statute unless it was at fault. 32 N.J. at 73, 159 A.2d at 106. The court did not "'agree,
however, that the phrase 'wrongful act' necessarily connotes fault, thus excluding from the benefits of the Contribution Law any party whose liability is based on liability without fault." Id. at
74, 159 A.2d at 106.
173 32 N.J. at 76, 159 A.2d at 107-08.
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mobile guest statute, spousal immunity, or the workers' compensation
law. 174
Adler's Quality Bakery also rejected the concept of indemnity
based upon the active negligence of the indemnitor contrasted with
the passive negligence of the indemnitee. The court reasoned that
"It]he present status of our law with respect to contribution among
joint torifeasors makes such a rule completely unjustified in policy or
logic."175 Against a negligent employer, however, neither activepassive indemnity nor contribution is available in New Jersey.176
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: INTRODUCTION

In the foregoing discussion it has been assumed that, regardless
of whether the employer was negligent, the employer's initial outlay
of compensation payments would be reimbursed out of the plaintiff's
recovery from the third party. 17 7 The employer, as well as the
employee, benefits from a recovery from a third party. If there is no
such recovery, the employer is responsible for payment of the compensation award. If there is such a recovery, and none of the burden
is shifted from the third party to the employer through indemnity or
contribution, the employer in effect pays nothing, regardless of' the
degree to which his negligence contributed to the employee's in174Id. at 76, 159 A.2d at 108. Furthermore, the court pointed out that although both an
employer and an airplane owner may be liable regardless of fault, liability for negligence on the
part of the employer, but not the airplane owner, was expressly prohibited by statute. Id. at 75,
159 A.2d at 107.
175Id. at 81, 159 A.2d at 110-11.
176 See, e.g., Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 483-84, 489, 378 A.2d 53,
59, 62 (Law Div. 1977).
177 Supra note 12 and accompanying text; Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 112 Ariz. 403, 409,
542 P.2d 1102, 1108 (1975); see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412 (1953); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 682, 39 A.2d 858, 861 (1944); Schweizer v. Elox Div.
of Colt Indus., 133 N.J. Super. 297, 299, 306, 336 A.2d 73, 74, 78-79 (Law Div. 1975), aff'd,
70 N.J. 280, 359 A.2d 857 (1976); Note, Workmen's Compensation: Should a Contributorily
Negligent Employer Be Subrogated?, 42 IND. L. J. 430 (1967).
There are very few states which do not provide for reimbursement of the employer. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page
1973 repl.); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (1978 repl.).
There are also a few states which guarantee to the employee a minimum amount of a
third-party recovery. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (6) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Where the recovery from the third party
is relatively small, the employee receives a portion of that recovery even though the employer
is not fully reimbursed.
In New Jersey, as in most jurisdictions, the employer is entitled to be reimbursed for
payments made to the employee before the employee reaps any benefit from a third party
recovery. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1959). The statutory allocation of costs of suit and
collection, including attorney's fees, is disregarded herein. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:238

jury. 178 The third party, on the other hand, is denied the right he
otherwise would have had to sue or implead another party who contributed to the injury, simply because that party was the employer of
the person injured. 179 Several courts and commentators have seen
this result as inequitable and have adopted or proposed a variety of
methods in an attempt to better balance the rights and interests of
the respective parties.
NEGLIGENT EMPLOYER DENIED REIMBURSEMENT

North Carolina
In 1932, the North Carolina supreme court held that the
employer could not be a joint tortfeasor and, therefore, could not be
joined as a codefendant in an action against a third party, 180 since the
workers' compensation law "discarded the theory of fault as the basis
of liability of' an employer to his employee."181 Subsequently, in
Brown v. Southern Railway,18 2 the third party asserted the
employer's contributory negligence as a defense in a suit arising out
of the employee's death. 183 Although the suit was brought by the
employee's representative, it was the employer who would have
primarily benefited by being reimbursed for its workers' compensation payments. 184 The North Carolina supreme court was sympa40 (West 1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
178 See Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1974). In Stark v. Posh
Constr. Co., 192 Pa. Super. Ct. 409, 413, 162 A.2d 9, 11 (Super. Ct. 1960), the court noted
that if the workers' compensation law did not apply, the employer would be liable in contribution for one-half the judgment against the third party, which would be over $55,000. Furthermore, if there were no action against the third party, the employer would be liable for workers',
compensation up to $20,000. Although there was both, the employer contended that it was
"liable for'nothing." The court found this conclusion to be "absurd and unreasonable." Id.
Nevertheless, this is the conclusion reached by the majority of courts. See 2A A. LARSON, supra
note 3, § 76.21, at 14-295.
179 Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43, 48 (Me. 1969); McDonnell Aircraft
Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Mo. 1959); Montoya v.
Greenway Aluminum Co., 10 Wash. App. 630, 633, 519 P.2d 22, 25 (1974).
180 Brown v. Southern By., 202 N.C. 256, 257, 263-64, 162 S.E. 613, 614, 618 (1932).
185 Id. at 263, 162 S.E. at 617. This case was decided only three years after the enactment of
the North Carolina statute permitting a defendant to implead a joint tortfeasor as a codefendant.
id.
182 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933).

183 Id. at 670, 169 S.E. at 420. After losing the attempt to implead the employer, Brown v.
Southern Ry., 202 N.C. 256, 162 S.E. 613 (1932), discussed in notes 180-81 supra and accompanying text, the defendant submitted an amended answer alleging that the employer was contributorily negligent and should not " 'profit by [its] own wrong or ... pluck good fruit from
the evil tree of [its] own planting.' " Brown v- Southern By., 204 N.C. at 670, 169 S.E. at 420.
184 Brown, 204 N.C. at 670, 169 S.E. at 420. The court treated the employer as a party
plaintiff. Id.
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thetic to the defendant's argument and held that "when the . . .
employer seeks to recover the amount paid by him, from such third
party, his hands ought not to have the blood of the dead or injured
workman upon them .... 185
Later cases reiterated and clarified the North Carolina policy that
the employer's negligence operates as a pro tanto bar to the recovery
of the amount the employer paid in compensation, even when the
employee rather than the employer brought the action against the
third party. 18 6 Therefore, if the employer negligently contributed to
the cause of the employee's injury, the third party's liability is re18 7
duced by the amount of the workers' compensation award.
California
Until 1957, California, following the common law rule, did not
allow contribution between joint tortfeasors. 88 Since the effect of
the North Carolina rule was to shift a portion of the burden from the
sued tortfteasor to another, the early California cases rejected the
rule. 189

185 Id. at 671, 169 S.E. at 420. The court elaborated: "[l]f
such defense be not recognized, an
employer could by his own negligence participate in the killing or injuring of the workman .. .
and then wash his hands of his own wrong .
I..."
Id.
The response of the New Jersey supreme court to a similar argument appeared in
Schweizer v. Elox Div. of Colt Indus., 70 N.J. 280, 359 A.2d 857 (1976), wherein it stated:
We are not at all impressed by the argument that the Legislature should not be
deemed to have intended a "reward" to a "wrongdoer". The latter characterization
is out of place in the industrial scene where human negligence by corporate agents
and employees is commonplace and certainly carries no moral connotations. The
legislative rationale for the existing scheme of the compensation act as a whole, read
together with the employer subrogation and reimbursement provisions, is plain and
quite defensible.
Id. at 287, 359 A.2d at 861.
16 Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 669-70, 73 S.E.2d 886, 892 (1953); see Poindexter v.
Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 235 N.C. 286, 288, 69 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1952); Essick v. City of
Lexington, 233 N.C. 600, 606, 65 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1951). However, an action against the
employer for contribution cannot be brought under North Carolina law. Lovette, 236 N.C. at
670, 73 S.E.2d at 892; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(e) (1972 repl.).
M Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 566, 75 S.E.2d 768, 773
(1953). The North Carolina policy outlined in the text has subsequently been codified. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(e) (1972 repl.).
1ssWitt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 70, 366 P.2d 641, 648, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376 (1961); see
CAL. CIv. Paoc. CODE §§ 875-880 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
1"9 The employer was entitled to be reimbursed despite his negligence, and the third party
was not entitled to have the judgment against him reduced by the amount of the workers'
compensation award. Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 434-35, 218 P.2d 17, 33
(1950); see Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, Ltd., 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 270-71, 84
P.2d 313, 321 (1938).
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Many courts have held that since the statute apparently gives the
employer an absolute right to reimbursement out of the third party
recovery no exception should be made by the court.' 9 0 In the 1961
case of Witt v. Jackson, 19 1 however, the California Supreme Court
held that "[i]n the absence of express terms to the contrary,"' 92 the
provisions granting reimbursement to the employer 19 3 were necessarily qualified by the legislative command that " 'In]o one can take advantage of his own wrong.' "194 Therefore, in contravention of the
19 5
majority position, California adopted the North Carolina theory. '

190 See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412 (1953); General Elec. Co. v.

Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89, 102 (5th Cir. 1968); Roberts v. American Chain & Cable
Co., 259 A.2d 43, 47 (Me. 1969); General Box Co. v. Missouri Utils. Co., 331 Mo. 845, 852-53,
55 S.W.2d 442, 445 (1932); Schweizer v. Elox Div. of Colt Indus., 70 N.J. 280, 285-87, 359
A.2d 857, 859-60 (1976); Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137,
144, 353 P.2d 358, 363 (1960); Sayler v. Holstrom, 239 N.W.2d 276, 283 (N.D. 1976).
In Schweizer, the court stated:
Except when construing the right of the employee, the Workmen's Compensation Act, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed....
[N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1959)] lays out a comprehensive legislative plan
for the application of the "statutory subrogation" for the employer or his insurance
carrier. How can it be said, in the light of the foregoing, that the court should write
in provisions that the Legislature in its wisdom did not?
70 N.J. at 306, 336 A.2d at 78-79. This case contained an excellent discussion of the majority
and minority views on reimbursement of a negligent employer.
191 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
19 Id. at 72, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
193 CAL. LAB.

CODE

§§ 3852-3853, 3856 (West 1971).

57 Cal. 2d at 72, 366 P.2d at 649, i7 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517
(West 1970)).
195 Id. at 71-72, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377. In Roe v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 884, 528 P.2d 771, 117 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1974), a settlement of the
employee's lawsuit against the third party was completed without any reference to the negligence of the employer. When the employee applied for workers' compensation benefits, the
employer claimed that the settlement received by the employee should be credited against its
workers' compensation liability. Id. at 886-87, 528 P.2d at 773, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 685. The court
held that this credit would be denied the employer if he was found to have been concurrently
negligent, despite the argument that this afforded the employee a double recovery. Id. at 88891, 528 P.2d at 774-76, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 686-88; see Gregory v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 899, 902, 528 P.2d 782, 784, 117 Cal. Rptr. 694, 696 (1974). See also
Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 357--63, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 403-07 (1967) (holding that
employers who elected not to become parties in third party suit were not deprived of due
process when employer's lien was barred at third party's motion). See generally Comment,
Workmen's Compensation: The Impact of the Witt v. Jackson Rule on the Law of Third Party
Settlements, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 651 (1970); Note, Torts: Workmen's Compensation:
Employers' Rights Against Third Party Tortfeasors-Witt v. Jackson (Cal. 1961), 50 CALIF. L.
REV. 571 (1962); Note, Workmen's Compensation and Third Party Suits: The Aftermath of Witt
v. Jackson, 21 HASTINGS L. J. 661 (1970); Note, Third Party and Employer Liability After Nga
Li v. Yellow Cab Companyfor Injuries to Employees Covered by Workers' Compensation, 50 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1029 (1977).
194
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Pennsylvania
Until recently, Pennsylvania followed a different route to achieve
the same final effect as the North Carolina and California courts. In
Maio v. Fahs,196 the third party sued by the employee brought in the
employer and another party as additional defendants, and the jury
returned a verdict against all three defendants jointly. 1 97 The
Pennsylvania supreme court articulated the theory that contribution
"is based not on the tort but arises by reason of an implied engagement of each to contribute on an equitable basis . . .and to bear the
common burden as reason and natural justice dictate." 198 Therefore,
even though the plaintiff could not have recovered directly from the
employer,' 99 the third party was entitled to contribution from the
employer up to the amount of' the employer's liability under the
workers' compensation law. 20 0 This limitation of the employer's liability for contribution was apparently designed to prevent the frustra20 1
tion of' the purposes of the workers' compensation law.
The court in Maio, by implying that a right to contribution was
not "on account of" an injury, circumvented the bar to contribution
presented by the language of the exclusivity provision of the workers'
compensation law. 2 0 2 It failed, however, to explain how the
employer, although not liable to the employee, could be "jointly or

19 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).

197 Id. at 182, 14 A.2d at 106-07.
198 Id. at 189, 14 A.2d at 109 (citing Parker v. Rodgers, 125 Pa. Super. Ct. 48, 51-52, 189
A. 693, 695 (Super. Ct. 1937)).
1 339 Pa. at 190, 14 A.2d at 110.
200 Id. at 191-92, 14 A.2d at 110-11. The plaintiff's recovery from the other defendants
would be reduced by the amount she had already received in compensation from the employer.
The defendant satisfying the judgment would be entitled to collect from the employer the
amount remaining payable in workers' compensation. Id. at 190, 14 A.2d at 110; see Davis v.
Gerstenslager Co., 302 F. Supp. 742, 743 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck
Co., 420 Pa. 97, 99-104, 216 A.2d 318, 319-21 (1966) (contrasting New Jersey and Pennsylvania
law); Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 458, 155 A.2d 836, 838 (1959); Shaull v. A.S. Beck N.Y.
Shoe Co., 369 Pa. 112, 116, 85 A.2d 698, 701 (1952); Hinton v. Waste Techniques Corp., 243
Pa. Super. Ct. 189, 195, 364 A.2d 724, 727 (Super. Ct. 1976); Stark v. Posh Constr. Co., 192
Pa. Super. Ct. 409, 416-17, 162 A.2d 9, 12 (Super. Ct. 1960).
201 Elston v. Industrial Lift
Co., 420 Pa. 97, 102--03 & n.3, 216 A.2d 318, 320 & n.3 (1966);
Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 458, 155 A.2d 836, 838 (1959); Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 192,
14 A.2d 105, 111 (1940); Stark v. Posh Constr. Co., 192 Pa. Super. Ct. 409, 416, 162 A.2d 9, 12
(Super. Ct. 1960).
202 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
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severally liable for a tort" so as to subject it to liability for contribu203
tion under the terms of the contribution statute.
In Brown v. Dickey, 20 4 the Pennsylvania supreme court conceded that under the Uniform ContributionAmong Tortfeasors Act of
1939 205 there could be no right to contribution from the employer
because "the employer [was] simply not liable in tort."' 2 0 6 Therefore, there was no common liability. 20 7 The court explained that
"[t]he limited right of contribution that [did] exist in Pennsylvania
[was] based on the equitable principle that the plaintiff should not
' 20 8
recover twice for the same wrong."
In 1974, the Pennsylvania workers' compensation exclusivity provision was amended to eliminate the employer's liability for such limited contribution in the absence of an express agreement. 20 9 The
210
amendment has not been applied retroactively.
Minnesota
Until recently Minnesota followed the majority rule, denying the
third party contribution from the employer on the ground that there
was no "common liability" between them. 2 1 1 In Lambertson v.
203 An Act to Provide for Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 1939 Pa. Laws No. 376, § 1, 1075
(current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-2089 (Purdon 1967)), quoted in 339 Pa. at
189, 14 A.2d at 109.
204 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959).
205 The present Pennsylvania contribution statute, PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 12, §§ 2082-2089

(Purdon 1967) (enacted 1951), is nearly identical to the Uniform ContributionTortfeasors Act of
1939.
206 397 Pa. at 461-62, 155 A.2d at 840.
207 Id. at 461, 155 A.2d at 840.
2o Id. at 462--63, 155 A.2d at 840; see Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 102 n.2,
216 A.2d 318, 320 n.2 (1966); Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809,
815-16 (D.R.I. 1968), rev'd, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. ,1969); Note, supra note 24, at 967.
209 An Act Amending the Act of June 2, 1915, 1974 Pa. Laws Act No. 263, § 6, 786-87
(codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)). The statute, as

amended, provides that
the employer . . . shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contribution, or
indemnity in any action at law, or otherwise, unless liability for such damages,
contributions [sic) or indemnity shall be expressly provided for in a written contract
entered into by the party alleged to be liable prior to the date of the occurrence
which gave rise to the action.
Id. at 787.
210 E.g., Teague v. Consolidated Bathurst, Ltd., 408 F. Supp. 980, 984 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
211 Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 372, 374-75, 104 N.W.2d
843, 847, 849 (1960). Hendrickson held that the workers' compensation law was only intended
to affect the rights of the employer and the employee inter se and did "not by its terms prevent
contribution or indemnity where appropriate." Id. at 374, 104 N.W.2d at 849 (emphasis added).
However, since the workers' compensation law eliminated all other liability of the employer,
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Cincinnati Corp.,212 Minnesota adopted the original Pennsylvania position allowing limited contribution. 2 13 The court pointed out that although the parties had "no common liability to the employee in
tort," 214 they were both liable to the employee for his injuries, one
in workers' compensation and the other in tort. 215 The court argued
that contribution is an "equitable remedy" which "should be utilized
to achieve fairness on particular facts, unlettered by outworn technical concepts like common liability." 2 16 Since the third party did not
benefit from the workers' compensation scheme, the court believed
that it correspondingly should not be deprived of any rights because
of it.

217

The Minnesota supreme court, in approving the Pennsylvania
rule, commented that "[t]his approach allows the third party to obtain
limited contribution, but substantially preserves the employer's interest in not paying more than workers' compensation liability." 2 18
Since Minnesota applies comparative negligence to contribution situations, 2 19 the Lambertson opinion directed that the employer be required to pay "an amount proportional to its percentage of negli220
gence, but not to exceed its total workers' compensation liability."
UNLIMITED CONTRIBUTION

Maritime Law: The Divided Damages Rule
In Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 22 1 a suit in admiralty involving the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 2 22 an
employee of a contractor was injured due to the collapse of the platthere could be no common liability between the employer and the third party and, therefore,
no right to contribution. Id.
212 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977).
213 Id. at 689.
214 Id. at 688 (emphasis in original).
215

Id.

216

Id.

217

Id. at 689 (quoting Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against

Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 351, 419 (1970)); see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, §§ 76.10-53,
at 14-287 to -407.
218 257 N.W.2d at 689.
219 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
220 257 N.W.2d at 689. It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania decisions on employer's
liability for contribution did not apportion the liability according to the employer's negligence,
see note 200 supra, since comparative negligence was not adopted in Pennsylvania until 1976.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2102 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
221 89 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd sub. nor.
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
222

33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
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form on which he was standing while working on board a vessel
owned by the third party. 22 3 The district court awarded contribution
on the basis of the ancient maritime rule that damages are to be
equally divided among tortfeasors. 2 24 The Third Circuit reversed,
taking the position that the employer could be required to contribute
only up to the amount of its workers' compensation liability. 2 25 The
Supreme Court, in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corp.,226 reversed, holding that the divided.damages doctrine in admiralty applied only to cases involving mutual fault collisions. 227 Refusing "to fashion new judicial rules of contribution,"' 228 tile Court
223 89 F. Supp. at 766.

224 Id. at 768. The divided damages rule is well established in admiralty; its origins have
been traced back as far as the 12th century. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
397, 401-02 (1975); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110 (1974);
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952); The North
Star, 106 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1882).
In Baccile, the jury had determined that the third party was 25% negligent and the
employer was 75% negligent. 89 F. Supp. at 766. Recognizing that the employer was not liable
to the employee for its negligence, the district court justified requiring the employer to contribute, despite the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation law, on the ground that the
employer had breached a duty to the third party to perform with due care. Id. at 767. The
court commented that "[tihe right to contribution between wrongdoers here does not stand on
subrogation, but arises directly from the tort." Id. Concluding that admiralty law governed the
case, the court molded the verdict to conform with "[t]he usual rule in admiralty," equally
divided damages, and required the employer to pay 50% of the judgment against the third
party. Id. at 768.
22 187 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd sub. nom. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling
& Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). There was no reference to the comparable prior
Pennsylvania decisions in the opinion. The court recognized that the employer could not be
required to contribute under the common law because there was no common liability, id. at
404, but pointed out that the employer and the third party "were, to use the preferable admiralty law description, 'mutual wrongdoers.'" Id. at 405. In admiralty, the court argued, equity
took precedence over "literal adherence to concepts derived from the common law." Id. at 404.
The compensation law was primarily aimed at the relationship of the employer with the
employee and did not co~npletely adjust the rights of the employer and the third party inter se.
Id. at 405. Following equitable principles, the court concluded that the employer should not
escape all liability when it negligently contributed to the employee's injury. id. at 405-06. To
avoid frustrating the purposes of the workers' compensation law, however, it was necessary to
limit the contribution recoverable by the third party to the amount of the workers' compensation liability. Id. at 406. This solution, in the court's opinion, "preserve[d] inviolate the
forward-looking objectives of the Act, and consistent with those objectives retain[ed] a substantial measure of equity in the legal relations between the employer and the third party." Id.; cf.
Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 689 (Minn. 1977) (arguing that similar solution achieved balance in terms of rights of parties). Both parties subsequently argued that' the
Third Circuit result, which was, in effect, the Pennsylvania rule, was "impractical and undesirable." Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952).
22

342 U.S. 282 (1952).

227Id. at 284-85.
228 Id. at 285. The Court felt that the legislature was better suited to weigh the complicated
considerations involved. Id. at 285-86. But cf. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
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held that the third party could not recover contribution in any
amount from the employer.2 29 The Supreme Court thereby adopted
the majority rule that an employer could not be required to contribute to a judgment recovered by an employee against a third
230
party.
Until the Supreme Court's ruling in Weyerhaeuser Steamship
Co. v. United States,2 3 1 the question of whether, in the case of
mutual fault collisions, the divided damages rule would supersede the
employer's immunity from contribution remained unanswered. In
that case, the Court held that the employer could be required to
contribute under the divided damages rule unlimited by the applicable amount of' workers' compensation liability. 2 3 2 The Court
employed the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction 233 to
reason that the exclusiveness of the employer's liability "to the
employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin,
and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages" 234 applied only to
people of the general class suggested by those specifically enumerated.23 5 Therefore, the statute, as applied to the particular factual
397, 409 (1975) (defending propriety of major judicial changes in divided damages rule).
229 342 U.S. at 287.
230 The holding of Halcyon was somewhat ambiguous. Although the problem of balancing the
interests of the parties in the workers' compensation situation was discussed, the opinion could
be read as denying contribution in all non-collision maritime cases. See id. at 284-85.
This ambiguity was authoritatively resolved in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,
417 U.S. 106 (1974), which distinguished Halcyon and allowed contribution in a non-collision
maritime situation where the party against whom it was sought was not protected by workers'
compensation limited liability. 417 U.S. at 111-13.
231 372 U.S. 597, 600 (1963). A United States Army vessel collided with a vessel owned by
the Weyerhaeuser Steamship Company. The latter brought an action against the United States;
the district court found both vessels at fault and applied the divided damages rule. Meanwhile,
a United States employee who was injured in the collision brought a suit against the
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Company, and settled for $16,000. The company attempted to include
that amount in the damages to be divided between the two vessels. The United States objected
on the ground that this was barred by the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation
law. Id. at 597-99.
232 See id. at 604.
231 See id. at 600-01. The ejusdem generis rule dictates that when specific enumerations of
particular classes of persons or things are followed by general words, the general words are
construed as applying only to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as those
specifically enumerated. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 90-91 (1975).
234 Federal Employees' Compensation Act, ch. 691, § 201, 63 Stat. 861-62 (1949) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976)), quoted in Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 600.
235 372 U.S. at 600-01. Similar reasoning was employed in Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v.
United States, 409 F.2d 994, 995 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 189, 192 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 493 F.2d 881 (3d
Cir. 1974).
The Weyerhaeuser Court also drew an analog) to Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Corp., 372 U.S. at 602-03, wherein the employer was required to indemnify the
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setting in Weyerhaeuser,23 6 was found not to preclude recovery by
23 7
the third party shipowner.
In 1975, in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 238 the Supreme Court modified the ancient divided damages rule by requiring
the liability for damages to be allocated in proportion to relative
fault. 23 9 Reliable Transfer did not itself involve the workers' compensation problem, but it is probable that in cases like Weyerhaeuser
the new rule would require an allocation of damages between the
employer and the third party on the basis of relative fault. 2 40
New York: Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.
In 1972, the Court of Appeals of' New York held that the workers' compensation liability provision imposes no limit on the amount
of contribution the employer can be required to pay to a third party.
Until it was joined by Illinois in 1977, New York was the only state
which took this position.
The leading case in New York, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 24 1 is
noteworthy because it judicially adopted a system of' apportionment of

third party based upon a contractual relationship despite the exclusive liability provision. See
text accompanying notes 62-67 supra. The Court reasoned that the divided damages rule "governed . . . the correlative rights and duties" of the parties in Weyerhaeuser with as much clarity
as did the contractual relationship in Ryan. 372 U.S. at 603.
Since the divided damages rule creates a direct duty between the shipowners themselves in
maritime law, see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 951 (1964), recovery is not barred by the exclusive liability provision. See also Ryan,
discussed in text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
236 In order for the rule in Weyerhaeuser to apply, there must be a collision or stranding, see
note 239 infra, caused by the mutual fault of both parties (normally vessels), one of whom is an
employer covered by the workers' compensation law in relation to an employee who was injured
as a result of the collision or stranding.
237 See 372 U.S. at 601. The Court looked to legislative history, stating that "[tihere [was] no
evidence whatever that Congress was concerned with the rights of unrelated third parties," to
reach the conclusion that the rights and liabilities of third parties were not affected by the
compensation law in question. Id.
2-6 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
239 Id. at 410-11. The Court described the divided damages rule as having been "most com-

monly applied in cases of collision between two vessels," id. at 397, but applied it, as modified,
to a stranding situation. But cf. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 283, 284 (1952) (Court refused to extend the divided damages rule "to non-collision
cases").
240 Reliable Transfer, by its terms, applied to situations in which "two or more parties have

contributed by their fault to cause
U.S. at 411 (emphasis added). It
injuries. Guidry v. LeBeouf Bros.
24130 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d

property damage in a maritime collision or stranding." 421
has since been applied, however, to liability for personal
Towing Co., 398 F. Supp. 952, 960-61 (E.D. La. 1975).
288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
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liability among tortfeasors according to fault. 24 2 The third party,
Dow Chemical Company, had asserted a right to indemnity from the
employer on the ground that the employer's negligence was "active"
while its own negligence was merely "passive." 2 43 The Court of Appeals of New York noted that this terminology "has in practice proven
elusive and difficult of fair application," 244 and suggested that although in some cases indemnity might be appropriate, in other circumstances the interests of fairness would require an apportionment
of responsibility. 245 Since the contribution statute then in effect was
too narrow to allow such apportionment, 24 6 the Dole court opted for
what it termed "partial indemnification." 2 47 This result was, in essence, contribution allocated according to the relative negligence of
the parties. 248 Dole has since been codified by a revision to the contribution statute, 24 9 and the Court of Appeals of New York has

242 See generally Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 300 N.E.2d 403, 347
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1973); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972); Ansubel, The Impact of New York's Judicially Created Loss Apportionment
Amongst Tortfeasors, 38 ALB. L. REV. 155 (1974); Schwab, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A
Preliminary Analysis, 45 N.Y. ST. B. J. 144 (1973).
243 30 N.Y.2d at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
244 Id. at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386. "'The terms 'primary' and 'secondary'

negligence .. . have been regarded as more accurate and technically appropriate. But the policy problem involves more than terminology." Id.
245

Id.

See id. at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87; An Act to Amend the Civil
Practice Law and Rules, 1964 N.Y. Laws ch. 388, § 5, 1256 (repealed 1974).
247 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. But cf. notes 249-50 infra
and accompanying text ("partial indemnification" now recognized to be contribution as result of
statutory change).
248 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. The court concluded
that where a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all, of
the negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that
part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the third party. To reach that
end there must necessarily be an apportionment of responsibility in negligence between those parties.
Id.
249 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 1401-1402 (McKinney 1976) (effective Sept. 1, 1974). The respective sections provide:
§ 1401. Claim for contribution
[T]wo or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among
them whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered
against the person from whom contribution is sought.
§ 1402. Amount of contribution
The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be the excess
paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judgment recovered by the
injured party; but no person shall be required to contribute an amount greater than
246
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clarified that the concept it had articulated was one of contribution
250
rather than indemnity.
In allowing contribution from the employer despite the workers'
compensation exclusive liability provision, Dole relied heavily on
Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates
Corp.251 It had been held in Westchester, where the employer had
committed a tort directly against the third party, that the former had
an independent duty to indemnify the latter.2 52 In Dole, the third
party was the manufacturer of a dangerous chemical which, when
2 53 Most
used by the employer, resulted in the death of an employee.
jurisdictions would not consider this relationship sufficient to create
an independent duty to indemnify the third party.2 54 Nevertheless,
Dole, without discussion, held that the third party's claim against the
employer was "based on a separable legal entity of rights" from the
original action brought by the employee's representative against the
third party. 2 55 The court quoted the argument set forth in Westchester that the third party " 'asserts its own right of recovery for breach
of an alleged independent duty or obligation owed to it by'the
[employer],' "256 and stated that this was "a precise description of
Dow's . . . claim" against the employer in Dole.2 57 The court did
not further explain the basis of the independent duty owed by the
2 58
employer in Dole.
The result in Dole is more easily explained in terms of the contribution statute which subsequently codified it. 2 59 The statute provides that "two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury . . . may claim contribution among
his equitable share. The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance with
the relative culpability of each person liable for contribution.
id.
250 See Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 39-40, 346 N.E.2d
520, 523, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (1976).
251 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938). "'The theoretical difficulties have been resolved for
this court by Westchester .
Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at
390.
252 278 N.Y. at 177-79, 15 N.E.2d at 567-69; see text accompanying notes 57-61 & 108-10
supra.
253 30 N.Y.2d at 145-46, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85.
254 See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.44, at 14-404 to -405; notes 144-51 supra and

accompanying text.
255 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
256 Id. at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (quoting Westchester, 278 N.Y. at
179, 15 N.E.2d at 568).
257 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
238 Id. at 152-53, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390-91.
29 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 1401-1402 (McKinney 1976).
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them whether or not an action has been brought . . . against the
person from whom contribution is sought." 260 Since the statute does
not require common liability, or even that both parties be liable directly to the plaintiff, the most common objections to requiring the
26
employer to contribute are not applicable. '
At this juncture it is appropriate to address the other major objection to contribution in these circumstances, namely, that it is
barred directly by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision itself.2 62 The statement in Dole that the right to recover from the
employer was "a separable legal entity," 26 3 buttressed by the codification of that right, 264 apparently created a right which ran directly to
the third party from the employer. 26 5 Presumably, the claim was not
considered to be "on account of" the injury to the employee and thus
26 6
was not barred by the exclusivity provision.
Illinois: The Skinner Trio
In an unheralded line of cases, 2 67 the Supreme Court of Illinois
allowed the manuf'acturers to recover unlimited contribution, based
upon comparative negligence, from the employers. 268 In all three
cases, an employee had been injured by a machine purchased by the

260 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1976).
261 See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
262 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.22, at 14-305 to -306. Most courts do not reach this

question since contribution is simply denied on the ground that there is no common liability to
support it. See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
Pennsylvania, which also apparently does not require common liability for contribution, see
text accompanying note 198 supra, has had to posit the existence of an obligation which is not
barred by the exclusivity provision in order to allow the third party to recover contribution from
the employer. See text accompanying notes 198 & 202 supra. See also Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 604 (1963); Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F.

Supp. 809, 810-16 (D.R.I. 1968), rev'd, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969).
263 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.

264 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 1401-1402 (McKinney 1976).

265 But see Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342, 346 (1st Cir. 1969) (contribution creates no direct liability).
266 It is interesting to note that the New York exclusive liability provision (,purrent version at

N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)) was the model for
the corresponding provision in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(current version at 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976)). Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,

350 U.S. '124, 131 n.5 (1956).
267 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 111.
2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977);
Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 I11.
2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977); Robinson v. International
Harvester Co., 70 I11.
2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1977).
268 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 111.
2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, 443
(1977); Stevens v. Silver mfg. Co., 70 I11.
2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1977); Robinson v.
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employer.269 The employee sued the manufacturer of the machine
on a strict liability theory.2 70 The manufacturer filed a third party
complaint against the employer for contribution or indemnity, alleg2 71
ing negligence.
Impressive legal and logical barriers stood in the way of the
court's decision: the rule against contribution among joint
tortfeasors; 272 the lack of judicial precedent or legislative sanction in
Illinois for comparative negligence principles; 273 the arguments
against allowing recovery by a strictly liable manufacturer from a negligent purchaser; 2 74 and finally, the immunity of a workers' compen-

International Harvester Co., 70 I11. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458, 459 (1977). In Robinson, the
court stated that these cases had
held that, as between the manufacturer and a purchaser-employer, a manufacturer
is entitled to maintain an action for contribution on a theory of comparative liability
where it is alleged that the employer's misuse of the product and/or assumption of
risk contributed to the employee's injury.
374 N.E.2d at 459.
269 In Skinner, the employee was injured while assisting another employee to correct a malfunction of an irijection molding machine. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co.,
40 Ill. App. 3d 99, 99-100, 351 N.E.2d 405, 406 (App. Ct. 1976). The employee alleged that
"the machine was defective, improperly designed and lacking in safety devices." Id.
The manufacturer alleged that the machine, which was twenty-one years old, id., had been modified by
intervening owners, and that the employer had negligently allowed the machine to be operated
despite the fact that the safety devices with which it had originally been equipped were inoperative or had been removed. 351 N.E.2d at 407.
270 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, 438
(1977); Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455, 456 (1977); Robinson v.
International Harvester Co., 70 I11. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458, 459 (1977). In Robinson, the
employee additionally alleged that the manufacturer was negligent. 374 N.E.2d at 459.
271 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, 438
(1977) (seeking contribution in amount "as would be commensurate with the degree of misconduct attributable to the [employer]"); Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 I11. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d
455, 456 (1977) (seeking indemnity "'of all or part' of the sum it was required to pay," and
arguing that equitable apportionment of loss was appropriate); Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 I11. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458, 458-59 (1977) (seeking total indemnification).
272 In Skinner, the Supreme Court of Illinois discussed the prior Illinois cases and the arguments in favor of abolishing the rule against contribution, and concluded that there was no
sound reason to continue to apply the rule. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co.,
70 I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, 438-42. In response to the argument that such changes
should be left to the state legislature, the court stated that "[w]here this court has created a rule
or doctrine which, under present conditions, we consider unsound and unjust, we have not only
the power, but the duty, to modify or abolish it." 374 N.E.2d at 442.
273 See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437,
444-45 (1977) (Ward, C.J., dissenting).
274 Chief Justice Ward, in a dissenting opinion, argued that since negligence is irrelevant to
the concept of strict liability, there would be no "common standard of comparison" with which
to determine the relative degree of fault of the parties. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package
Mach. Co., 70 IlI. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, 445 (1977) (Ward, C.J. dissentingi. Justice
Dooley, also dissenting, distinguished Dole since in that case the employee's action against the
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sation employer from liability on account of an injury to an
employee. 2 75 As one of the three dissenting justices dramatically
2 76
stated, "[ltoday we have buried a great body of Illinois law."
The workers' compensation issue was only briefly discussed in
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. 27 7 The
majority commented that "[t]he fact that the employee's action
against the employer is barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act
. . . would not preclude the manufacturer's third party action against
the employer for indemnification (Miller v. DeWitt, .. .) and should
not serve to bar its action for contribution." 278 In Miller v.
Dewitt, 27 9 the Illinois supreme court had allowed a passively negligent
third party to recover indemnity from an actively negligent employer,
2 0
although recognizing the merits of the employer's arguments. ,
Two of the dissenting justices in Skinner addressed the problem
of the workers' compensation bar to the employer's liability. Justice
Underwood argued that, in Miller, the employer was held liable for
indemnity only because the employer "was more culpable than" the
third party, and it would be unjust for the third party to bear the
entire burden. 2 8 1 The Justice believed that requiring contribution
from an employer regardless of whether the employer's culpability
was greater than the third party's "repudiate[d], in a manner never
contemplated by Miller, the very theory upon which the Workmen's
Compensation Act became law." 2 8 2 Justice Dooley, in his dissenting
opinion, raised the argument which has been accepted by the majority of state courts: 283 the employer had no tort liability to the
employee, had no common liability to the manufacturer, was not a

manufacturer was based upon negligence rather than strict liability. 374 N.E.2d at 449 (Dooley,
J., dissenting).
275 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

276 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, 446
(1977) (Dooley, J., dissenting).
277 70 I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, 443 (1977).
278 Id. (citations omitted).
279 37 I11. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
280 226 N.E.2d at 640-42. Under Miller, the Illinois position is unusually liberal to the third
party. see note 128 supra and accompanying text.
281 374 N.E.2d at 446 (Underwood, J., dissenting). In Miller, the court had reasoned that
unless a third party who has not been guilty of active negligence can succeed in an
action against an employer who has been guilty of active negligence, the third party
will be made to bear the ultimate burden of a loss which should fall on the
employer.
37 111.2d at 289, 226 N.E.2d at 641.
282 374 N.E.2d at 446 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
283 See note 157 supra and accompanying text.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:238

joint tortfeasor, and therefore could not be liable for contribution. 2 8 4
2 85
The majority opinion failed to address either of these points.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS DEVELOPED UNDER FEDERAL LAW

The Murray Credit
In the 1968 case of' Murray v. United States, 28 6 the Court of
Appeals for the District of' Columbia agreed with the majority view
that the third party could not get contribution from the employer.2 8 7
Mitigating the harshness of this rule, the court held that if the
employer was concurrently negligent the judgment against the third
288
party should be reduced by one-half.

Murray was an extension of the rule of Martello v. Hawley. 2 89 In
that case, the plaintiff had settled with and released one joint
tortfeasor and instituted an action against the other torfeasor.29 0 The
Martello court ruled that if the released tortfeasor would have been
required to contribute in the absence of such release, the sued
tortfeasor was entitled to a credit for one-half the verdict. 29 1 Analogiz284 374 N.E.2d at 449-50, 452-53 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
285 The majority opinion did not acknowledge, as did the dissent, the multitude of decisions

in other courts which have held that contribution could not be recovered from an employer. 374
N.E.2d at 452-53 (Dooley, J., dissenting); see note 157 supra.
286 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Judge Leventhal wrote the opinion for a unanimous
panel which included the then Judge Burger.
287 Id. at 1364. "As a general rule," the court commented,
workmen's compensation statutes terminate the private employer's common law tort
liability and substitute a duty to pay a prescribed compensation not based on fault.
That remedy is made exclusive. In such a situation the employer cannot be a joint
tortfeasor. Since there is no.common liability between the employer and the thirdparty defendant sued in tort, the employer cannot be forced to contribute to the
other defendant.
Id.
288 Id. at 1365-66. This portion of the court's decision has been characterized as dictum, e.g.,
Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Turner v. Excavation
Constr., Inc., 324 F.Supp. 704, 705 (D.D.C. 1971), since it was not necessary to the central
holding of the case, the denial of contribution. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.22, at
14-315.
289 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962); see Murray, 405 F.2d at 1365-66.
290 300 F.2d at 722.
291Id. at 724. The court recognized that if the settlement was less than half the verdict, the
plaintiff's recovery would be reduced. However, the court reasoned that
by his settlement, the plaintiff has sold one-half of his claim for damages. Anything
else would be unfair to the settling tort-feasor, who has bought his peace, and
unfair to the defendant tort-feasor, who should not be disadvantaged by a settlement to which he was not a party ....
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ing a workers' compensation payment to a settlement, the Murray
court applied the Martello rationale to the workers' compensation
292
situation before it.
Although followed in the District of Columbia, 293 Murray has
been severely criticized. 294 It has been suggested that the effect of
the Murray Credit is to shift the loss from the third party to the
injured employee, 2 95 since the employer cannot be required to contribute. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Murray court failed
to consider whether the reasons supporting the allowance of a credit
for a voluntary settlement of a tort claim applied equally to the workers' compensation "settlement" imposed by the legislature. 296 The
rationale of Martello was that the failure to allow such a credit "would
leave the door too far open to fraud and collusion," 2 9 7 since it would
allow the plaintiff to release one tortfeasor for a minimal amount and
collect full damages from the other. This consideration is not present
See 405 F.2d at 1365-466.
293 Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 730 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This case,
an action to determine whether the cross-claim against the employer was properly tried by a
judge without a jury, id., emphasized the equitable nature of the Murray Credit. Id. at 731.
Dawson applied the rule, established in Murray with reference to the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (Supp. 111 1968) (current version 1976), to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970) (current
version 1976). 467 F.2d at 729 & n.3. Subsequently, other courts, in considering the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, have expressly refused to apply the
Murray Credit, arguing, inter alia, that such a credit would interfere with the legislature's
scheme for adjusting the rights of the parties embodied in the 1972 amendments to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976). Dodge v.
Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Hubbard v. Great Pac. Shipping Co., Monrovia, 404 F. Supp.
1242, 1243-44 (D. Ore. 1975). See also Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 145-46 (3d
Cir. 1977); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 764, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Turner v. Excavation Constr., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 704, 705 (D.D.C. 1971).
11 See, e.g., 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.22, at 14-314 to -319.
295 Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Santino v. Liberian Distance Transps. Inc., 405 F.
Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 488, 378
A.2d 53, 61 (Law Div. 1977); see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.22, at 14-318 to -319.
The Murray court reasoned that "[t]he common law recovery of the injured employee is
thus reduced in consequence of the employee's compensation act, but that act gave him assurance of compensation even in the absence of fault." 405 F.2d at 1366. It should be noted,
however, that most jurisdictions follow a policy of interpreting the workers' compensation law in
favor of the employee. E.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 391
F. Supp. 420, 428 (D. Vt. 1975); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Minn.
1977).
296 Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 2A A.
LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.22, at 14-316 to -318.
292

297 300 F.2d at 723.
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in the workers' compensation situation since the compensation paid
2 98
by the employer is dictated by the legislature.
Another problem with the holding in Murray is the question of
reimbursement of the employer for its workers' compensation payments. Neither Murray itself, nor the case which followed it in the
District of Columbia, 2 99 explicitly stated whether the employer remained entitled to reimbursement of' its workers' compensation outlay
or was deprived of reimbursement on account of its negligence. 30 0 Of
course, if the employer is reimbursed, the employee is left with only
one-half the damages assessed by the jury. However, in light of the
statute, there may be no justification for withholding the reimbursement.3 0 1 It is likely that the Murray court intended that the
employer be denied reimbursement, but this may be impossible to
accomplish in other jurisdictions due to prior interpretations of the
30 2
applicable statutes.
Murray has also been criticized for the arbitrariness of a fifty
percent reduction in the judgment regardless of the proportionate
negligence of the employer. 303 It has been suggested that as a result
of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co.,304 the Murray Credit might be applied to reduce the judgment
against the third party in proportion to the employer's negligence,
30 5
rather than by an arbitrary fifty percent.
A majority of other jurisdictions do not follow the general
Martello rule in determining the rights of the parties where there has
been a settlement with one of several joint tortfeasors and, therefore,
298 See Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 486-87, 378 A.2d 53, 61 (Law
Div. 1977); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.22, at 14-316 to -318.
29 Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The opinion con-

tained a cryptic remark in a footnote: "The employer's right to reimbursement from his
employee is not an issue in this case." Id. at 730 n.3.
300 The commentators have reached varying conclusions. Professor Larson believed that the
employer in Murray would be entitled to reimbursement. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, §
76.22, at 14-318 (1976). Others have concluded that the employee would retain the workers'
compensation benefits under Murray. Davis, supra note 12, at 580; see Brkaric v. Star Iron &
Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516, 524-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 68, at
597.
30, See, e.g., Turner v. Excavation Constr., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 704, 705 (D.D.C. 1971).
302 Id.
303 Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (D. Ore. 1975);
see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.22, at 14-319.
3-M 421 U.S. 397 (1975); notes 238-40 supra and accompanying text.
305 Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Davis, supra
note 12, at 580. Reliable Transfer is of course not binding precedent, since its holding directly
affected only the maritime divided damages rule, 421 U.S. at 411, but it contained strong
language in favor of assessing damages according to relative fault. 421 U.S. at 405-11.
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of course, no basis for its extension to workers' compensation situations exists. For example, the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act specifies that a release of one joint tortfeasor reduces
the recovery from the others by the amount of consideration paid for
the release, or by the amount specified in the release if it is greater.

3 06

In an approach similar to that of Martello, New Jersey courts
have reduced damages in proportion to fault where there was a settlement with a joint tortfeasor. 3° 7 Nevertheless, the only New Jersey
court which has addressed the question refused to give the third
party tortfeasor the benefit of the Murray Credit. 30 8 In the 1977
case of Arcell v. Ashland Chemical Co.,309 the court reasoned that
the workers' compensation award was not comparable to a voluntary
settlement. Furthermore, the court believed that the Murray Credit
"merely shift[ed] any inequity in the present system from the shoulders of the third-party tortfeasor to those of' the injured em3 10
ployee."
306 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1939 & 1955 versions). For a
list of those states which have enacted the Uniform Act, see 12 UNIFORM LAWs ANNOTATED 57

(1975).
Interpreting the Uniform Act as adopted in Maryland, 1941 Md. Laws ch. 344, § 1, 548-50
(codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1972 repl.)), the district court for the District of
Columbia, in McKenney v. Capitol Crane Corp., 321 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1971), held that
the Murray Credit was not available "since the basis for contribution among tortfeasors is different in the two jurisdictions." Id. at 883. The court noted that the right to contribution in
Maryland was statutory, and in the District of Columbia it was part of the common law. Id. The
court failed to explain, however, why, in the workers' compensation situation, a reduction along
the lines of the Uniform Act should not be allowed under Maryland law.
307 Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 232, 241, 208 A.2d 129, 131, 136 (1965); see Judson v.
People's Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.J. 17, 34-36, 134 A.2d 761, 770-71 (1957); Judson v. People's
Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 92-93, 110 A.2d 24, 36-37 (1954) (Brennan, J.); Kuna v.
Hollman, 137 N.J. Super. 199, 205, 348 A.2d 550, 553 (Law Div. 1975); Note, 12 RUTGERS L.
REV. 533 (1958). The reasoning of Judson was adopted, at least in part, in Martello. See 300
F.2d at 724 n.4.
30' Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 488, 378 A.2d 53, 62 (Law Div.
1977).
309 152 N.J. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (Law Div. 1977).
310 Id. at 486-88, 378 A.2d at 61. Arcell also indicated that since a negligent employer is
entitled to reimbursement, Schweizer v. Elox Div. of Colt Indus., 70 N.J. 280, 284, 359 A.2d
857, 859 (1976), the employee would lose the benefit of the workers' compensation "settlement." 152 N.J. Super. at 488, 378 A.2d at 61-62. The court commented that "[a] more persuasive argument could be presented for adoption of the 'Murray Credit' if an employer found to
be negligent was not entitled to reimbursement." id. at 488, 378 A.2d at 62.
In Holt v. Ferdon Equip. Co., 72 F.R.D. 564, 571-72 (D.N.J. 1976), the court argued that
the workers' compensation scheme "amounts to a contract to settle potential tort claims in
advance," id. at 571, and the only difference between this contract of settlement and a voluntary settlement of a claim is that the former is made before the injury and the latter is made
after the injury. See id. at 572. "But if New Jersey allows the reduction in one case but not in
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The Shellman Doctrine
In the short-lived and unreported district court holding in
Shelman v. United States Lines, Inc.,311 a proportionate reduction in
the judgment against the third party was allowed. The employer was
denied reimbursement of' its workers' compensation outlay. Thus, the
employee's total recovery was the percentage of the verdict allocated
to the third party plus the workers' compensation benefits. 3 12 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, "reject[ing] both the Murray Credit and
Shellman Doctrines because they [were] contrary to the weight of*
authority and because they impose[d] unjustified burdens upon the
3 13
injured longshoreman."
The Fourth Circuit, in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (Edmonds 1),3 14 disagreed with the argument that the
longshoreman was unjustifiably burdened by a reduction made in the
judgment against the third party as a result of the employer's negligence. 3 15 The court suggested that the longshoreman was simply
unable to sue the employer for its negligence because of the exclusive
liability provision, but in return the longshoreman received guaran316
teed minimum benefits under the workers' compensation law.
the other, depending on whether the contract of settlement is made after injury or before,
serious federal constitutional issues would seem implicated." Id.
"I Civil No. 72-1902-R (D. Cal. Nov. 25, 1974). This case, like Dawson, 467 F.2d 727 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), was governed by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
312 See Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). Since the stevedore employer was found 70% negligent and the third
party shipowner 30% negligent, the district court reduced the employee's damages from
$15,485 to $4,645. Id.
313 Id.
at 680; accord, Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884,
887-89 (5th Cir. 1978). The Shellman court stated that "it is ... clear that the injured plaintiff
is entitled to recover the full amount of his damages." 528 F.2d at 679. Since the employer's
appeal was voluntarily dismissed, the Ninth Circuit discussion in Shellman of the employer's
right to reimbursement was dictum. Id. at 678 & n.2. The court took the position that any
reduction in or denial of reimbursement was precluded by the Supreme Court decision in Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). 528 F.2d at 678 n.2. Pope & Talbot had given
short shrift to an argument that a negligent employer should not be entitled to reimbursement
and that the judgment against the third party should be reduced accordingly. 346 U.S. at 41112. The third party in Pope & Talbot urged a reduction in the judgment equal to the workers'
compensation benefits, id. at 411, rather than in proportion to the employer's negligence, as
-was accepted by the lower court in Shellman. See 528 F.2d at 676. The argument that failure to
reimburse the employer would frustrate the purpose of the workers' compensation law, as Pope
& Talbot held, 346 U.S. at 412, applies equally to both these systems.
314 558 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978).
315 558 F.2d at 192.
316 Id. In the words of the court, longshoremen
have no inherent right to recover from a vessel damages caused by the negligence
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The Recommendation of Cohen and Dougherty
A suggestion very similar to the lower court holding in Shellman
was advanced by commentators Cohen and Dougherty in their discussion of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. 31 7 In the situation where the employee
recovered a judgment against a third party tortfeasor and the
employer had negligently contributed to the injury, Cohen and
Dougherty recommended:
(1) the judgment against the third party should be reduced by an
amount proportionate to the employer's negligence;318
(2) the employer should be liable for its percentage of negligence
in relation to the total judgment, but only up to the amount of its
31 9
workers' compensation liability.
In practice, the employee would retain the workers' compensation benefits. The judgment recovered by the employee from the
third party would be reduced, first, by the percentage of the
employer's negligence, and second, by any reimbursement to which
the employer is entitled because the liability for its proportionate
320
negligence was lower than its workers' compensation liability.

of a stevedore. To the extent the longshoreman receives a somewhat lesser amount
than he otherwise would have, his complaint lies . . . with the compensation
scheme of the Act that prevents him from recovering damages from his employer,
for a concomitant of the stevedore's no-fault liability is the exclusivity of the compensation remedy against it. Thus, even as the longshoreman receives a lesser recovery, he benefits from one of the Act's many trade-offs; he becomes entitled to
statutory benefits without having to prove fault on the part of anyone.
Id.
317 Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 68, at 606. The scheme was approved by the court in
Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (D. Ore. 1975), but
not adopted because of a contrary holding within the district in Hubbard v. Great Pac. Shipping
Co., Monrovia, 404 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Ore. 1975). See 398 F. Supp. at 1231. It was also
discussed approvingly in Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516, 525 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), although the court did not decide the issue.
318 Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 68, at 606. The authors also noted that the judgment
must be reduced by the amount of the employee's contributory negligence. Id. Under the
Cohen and Dougherty plan, therefore, "the third party actually responds to the employee only
for that amount of the employee's damages as is equal to the third party's proportion of the
fault." Id.
319 Id. "Just as every employee will be guaranteed minimum benefits of workmen's compensation, so will every employer be guaranteed a maximum liability of compensation benefits,
whether directly or indirectly, for any employee's industrial accident." Id. (emphasis in original).
320 Id.
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Davis: The Comparative Negligence Between Systems Approach
An unusual variation on the scheme suggested by Cohen and
Dougherty-has been recommended by another commentator, Clifford
Davis.3 21 Analyzing the problem in terms of the interaction between
two conflicting systems, 32 2 Davis recommended the adoption of "a formula where each system contributes to the payment of losses in
proportion to its degree of fault. The percentage of fault of the actors
in each system would be applied to the level of benefits within that
system." 323 The employer's liability for negligence would be calculated as a percentage of the total possible workers' compensation liability, rather than as a percentage of' the total judgment. 324 As a
result, the employee's total recovery would be lower than in the
Cohen and Dougherty plan wherever the judgment is greater than
3 25
the workers' compensation liability.
Fourth Circuit: Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
In Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantiqne (Edmonds
an injured longshoreman had brought an action against a vessel
for negligence.3 2 7 The jury returned a verdict for the longshoreman
in the amount of $100,000.328 The stevedore employer was not a
party to the case. 3 2 9 The jury, however, made a determination of
1),326

Davis, supra note 12, at 580-83.
See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
Davis, supra note 12, at 580.
Id. This concept has rarely been advanced, although a similar suggestion was made in
passing in Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342, 345 (1st Cir. 1969). The
district court had adopted the Pennsylvania rule, allowing the third party to recover contribution from the employer in the amount of its workers' compensation liability. 293 F. Supp. 809,
815-16 (D.R.I. 1968). The First Circuit reversed, refusing to allow contribution, 419 F.2d at
347, see text accompanying notes 158-61 supra, but suggested that if contribution were allowed,
the employer might pay one-half of the amount for which it would have been liable if solely
negligent, i.e., one-half of its workers' compensation liability. 419 F.2d at 345; see id. at 348 n.*
(Coffin, J., concurring).
32 Of course, the judgment normally will be greater than the workers' compensation liability. See, e.g., Miller v. DeWitt, 37 I11.2d 273, 289, 226 N.E.2d 630, 640 (1967); Shanahan v.
Monarch Eng'r Co., 219 N.Y. 469, 478, 114 N.E. 795, 798 (1916).
326 558 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 99
S. Ct. 348 (1978).
327 Id. at 188-89.
328 Id. at 189.
329 Id. at 188. The longshoreman had received over $20,000 in workers' compensation benefits from the stevedore employer. Id. at 189.
321
322
323
324
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the degree to which the negligence of each of the three parties contributed to the cause of the injury, assigning twenty percent to the
vessel, seventy percent to the stevedore employer, and ten percent
33 0
to the longshoreman himself.
In Edmonds I, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit expressed a preference for a reduction in the verdict similar
to that adopted by the district court in Shellman and recommended
by Cohen and Dougherty. 3 3 ' The court held, however, that under
the constraints of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act the employer could not be denied reimbursement.3 3 2 The
Edmonds I solution was unique: the vessel owner was held liable for
its percentage of negligence relative to the total judgment plus the
amount of' the employer's workers' compensation liability, up to a
maximum of the total amount of the judgment.33 3 Under such an
approach, the employee's recovery would be the same as under the
Cohen and Dougherty scheme, but the portion which would have
been paid by the employer would be paid instead by the vessel.
Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed. 3 3 4 The Edmonds II court held that the vessel
owner could be held liable only "to the extent its fault contributed to
the injury." 33 5 The court reached this conclusion through an analysis
336
of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
The Act provides that an injured employee may bring an action
against a vessel whose negligence caused the injury, and that the
employer shall have no liability whatsoever for damages in such an
action. 3 37 The court believed that there was a conflict between this

... Id. at 189. The district court reduced the award by 10%, the percentage of the
longshoreman employee's contributory negligence, and entered a judgment against the vessel

owner for the $90,000 balance. Id.
331 Id. at 192. After arguing that the vessel's liability should be reduced, id. at 191-92, the
court commented: "If we were left purely to our own devices, an attractive holding might be to
bar the stevedore from asserting an equitable lien if it were negligent .. . ." Id. at 192.
332 Id. at 192-93. The Act provided for an assignment to the stevedore of the longshoreman's
right of action against the vessel, when there had been a workers' compensation award. 33
U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976); see The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943).
... 558 F.2d at 189, 193-94. The court balanced the interests of the parties by a result "in
which we preserve the stevedore's lien, we preserve the longshoreman's right of action against
the vessel for negligence, both contemplated by the statute, and, so far as possible, only hold
the vessel for its own negligence." Id. at 193.
334 Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978).
335 Id. at 1155.
336 Id. at 1154-56.
337 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
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provision and a literal reading of the following sentence,3 3 8 which
provides that "no such action shall be permitted" by an employee of
the stevedore if the negligence of the stevedore caused the injury.3 3 9 The court felt that, in a situation in which both the vessel
and the employer were negligent, the first sentence appeared to
permit the employee to bring an action against the vessel, while the
second sentence appeared to bar him from doing so. 3 40 The court
concluded that the two sentences could "be harmonized only if read
in apportioned terms." 3 4 1 Therefore, the vessel should be liable
only to the extent of' its own fault, and should be insulated from liabil2
ity to the extent of' the stevedore's fault. 34
A critical question was left unanswered by the Edmonds II court.
Since the stevedore employer was not a party to the case, the court
declined to decide whether the stevedore was entitled to reimbursement for its workers' compensation payments. 3 43 If' to the extent of
its negligence, the stevedore were denied the benefit of* its lien on
the recovery from the vessel, the outcome would be the solution recommended by Cohen and Dougherty. A very different result would
be obtained if the stevedore employer were allowed to enforce the
lien as provided by the statute, since the stevedore would pay little
or nothing and the employee would absorb the loss. 3 4 4 Despite the
3- 577 F.2d at 1155.
3 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
340 577 F.2d at 1155; see Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp.
1224, 1232 (D. Ore. 1975). "The sentences are irreconcilable," the court stated, "if read to
mean that any negligence on the part of the ship will warrant recovery while any negligence on
the part of the stevedore will defeat it." Id. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Hall disagreed,
arguing that "[t]he second sentence is not in conflict with the first, but simply says that the
plaintiff may not base his claim against the shipowner upon the negligence of the stevedore."
Id. at 1157 (Hall, J., dissenting).
341 577 F.2d at 1155. But see id. at 1157 (Hall, J., dissenting).
342 Id. at 1155. Contra, e.g., Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d
884, 887-89 (5th Cir. 1978); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669,
671-73 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Shellman v. United States Lines,
Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Solsvik v.
Maremar Compania Naviera, S.A., 399 F. Supp. 712, 714 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
The Edmonds I1 court argued that the reduction in the recovery was not harsh to the
longshoreman, since he was guaranteed minimum compensation without regard to fault, and
retained a right of action against the vessel for its negligence. 577 F.2d at 1156. The dissent
believed that even if the result was a just one, it could not be achieved without congressional
action. Id. at 1158 (Hall, J., dissenting).
343 577 F.2d at 1156. The court suggested that the vessel owner interplead the stevedore and
the longshoreman so that the parties' relative rights to the $20,000 recovery could be litigated.
Id.
344 See id. Since, in EdmQnds, the workers' compensation payments were greater than the
$20,000 judgment, 558 F.2d at 189, the stevedore employer would pay only the difference if it
were reimbursed for those payments. Of the $100,000 verdict, the employee would recover
only the workers' compensation amount.
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absence of the stevedore employer, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Edmonds, and thus some of the confusion in the cases
arising under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa34 5
tion Act may soon be resolved.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Legislative measures intended to immunize the employer from
liability to a third party have been invalidated on constitutional
grounds by the supreme courts of two states, Minnesota 3 4 6 and
Florida. 347 In Minnesota, a standard exclusive liability provision had
been a part of the workers' compensation statute for several years
prior to the 1954 case of Lunderberg v. Bierman.34s In Lunderberg,
the Minnesota supreme court allowed the third party to recover indemnity from the employer based upon a bailor-bailee relationship. 34 9 In 1960, the same court, in Hendrickson v. Minnesota
Power & Light Co., 350 outlined a number of situations in which a
third party could recover indemnity from an employer 35 1 and stated
that the workers' compensation law was not a bar to such recovery. 3 52
345 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978).
34 Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 369, 215 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1974); see notes 355-66
infra and accompanying text.
347 Sunspan Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4, 6-7 (Fla.
1975); see notes 367-80 infra and accompanying text.
348 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954); see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (West 1966).

349 Id. at 365-66, 63 N.W.2d at 366. An employee of an automobile dealer was injured as a
passenger when a co-employee was driving the third party's car. Id. at 350, 63 N.W.2d at 357.
The employee collected workers' compensation from the dealer and brought an action against
the third party who owned the automobile. Id. at 350-51, 63 N.W.2d at 357. The owner served
a third party complaint on the dealer-employer, and the court held that the complaint stated a
good cause of action. Id. at 351, 366, 63 N.W.2d at 357, 366.
350 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960).
351 Id. at 372-73, 104 N.W.2d at 848. The court stated that indemnity generally can b6
recovered only in the following situations:
(1) Where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or vicarious liability
for damage caused by the one sought to be charged.
(2) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability by action at the
direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be charged.
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability because of a breach
of duty owed to him by the one sought to be charged.
(4) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability merely because of
failure, even though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct of the one
sought to be charged.
(5) Where there is an express contract between the parties containing an
explicit undertaking to reimburse for liability of the character involved.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Indemnity is no longer allowed in the fourth situation in Minnesota.
Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 366-68 (Minn. 1977).
352 258 Minn. at 374, 104 N.W.2d at 849. The workers' compensation law was "intended to
control only the rights between employer and employee and [did] not by its terms prevent
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In 1967, the Minnesota legislature amended the workers' compensation statute so as to immunize the employer from liability for
indemnity in the absence of an express agreement.3 53 The amendment provided that where the third party was held liable to, or settled with, the employee, "the employer shall have no liability to
reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such judgments or
settlements in absence of a written agreement to do so executed prior
to the injury." 3 54 The amendment was challenged on due process
grounds in Carlson v. Smogard.3 55 In that case, the third party,
Smogard, had purchased a used automobile from Quality Mercury,
Inc. 3 5 6 The automobile had recurring problems, including failure of
the hood latch, for which Smogard repeatedly returned it to the
dealer for repair. 35 7 Following a repair of the transmission, Carlson,
an employee of Quality Mercury, Inc., offered to test drive the car.
Allegedly, the hood flew open during the drive, and Carlson had a
3 58
heart attack as a result.
Carlson sued Smogard, 359 and Smogard in turn brought an action
seeking indemnity or contribution from Carlson's employer.3 6 0 Since
there was no express agreement for indemnity, 3 6 1 the trial court
granted the employer summary judgment on the basis of the amendment to the workers' compensation statute. 3 62
contribution or indemnity where appropriate." Id. Contribution, however, was barred because
it is based upon a common liability which is not present where the employer is immune to an
action by the employee. Id. at 372, 374-75, 104 N.W.2d at 847, 849; see note 157 supra and
accompanying text. But cf. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 689 (Minn. 1977)
(allowing limited contribution), discussed in text accompanying notes 212-20 supra.
'53An Act Relating to Workmen's Compensation, 1967 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. ch. 40, § 4,
2227 (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978)).
354

Id.

355 298 Minn. 362, 366, 215 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1974).
356 id. at 364, 215 N.W.2d at 617.
357 Id. At the time of purchase the dealer promised to repair the hood latch, among other

things, prior to delivery. The automobile was subsequently returned to the dealer for the same
purpose. Id.
358

Id.

Id. at 365, 215 N.W.2d at 617. Since Smogard had added an extension wire to the latch,
Carlson alleged that the cause of the accident was Smogard's negligence in doing so. Id.
360 Id. at 365, 215 N.W.2d at 618. Smogard alleged that the conduct of Quality Mercury,
Inc. was "negligent, careless, and unlawful .... Smogard also alleged breach of express and
implied warranties, misrepresentation, breach of contract, and strict liability in tort for selling a
defective vehicle." Id.
361 Id. at 363--64, 215 N.W.2d at 617. The Minnesota supreme court pointed out that "it is
doubtful that a private party purchasing an automobile would envision demanding a written
agreement from the dealership to provide indemnification. And even less practical is the idea
that a dealer would so agree .
I..."
Id. at 368, 215 N.W.2d at 619.
362 Id. at 363-64, 215 N.W.2d at 617. For text of amendment, see text accompanying note
354 supra.
359
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the amendment
violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 8, of the Minnesota constitution. 3 63 Common law
rights established by prior decisions 3 64 were abrogated by the
amendment, the court said, without any provision for a substitute
remedy and without a "rational relationship to a legitimate legislative
objeotive." 36 5 The court emphasized that Smogard, as a third party,
had no connection with, or relationship to, the workers' compensation
system.366

In Florida, as in Minnesota, there had been judicial precedent
for a recovery of indemnity from the employer 3 67 despite the exclusive liability provision of the workers' compensation law. 36 8

The

legislature subsequently amended the statute in an attempt to immunize the employer from liability to a third party. 36 9 In Sunspan
363 Id. at 369, 215 N.W.2d at 620.
364 The prior decisions referred to by the court included Keefer v. A] Johnson Constr. Co.,
292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971), Hendrickson, discussed in notes 350-52 supra and accompanying text, and Lunderberg, discussed in notes 348-49 supra and accompanying text. See
298 Minn. at 367-68, 215 N.W.2d at 618-19.
365 298 Minn. 362, 366, 368-69, 215 N.W.2d 615, 618-19. The court did not discuss possible
legislative purposes in amending the statute. The court did suggest that the provision would
make more sense if applied to a third party and an employer who had "substantially equal
bargaining power," such as a contractor and a subcontractor. Id. at 368, 15 N.W.2d at 619.
Contra, Leppala v. Sawbill Canoe Outfitters, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 409 (D. Minn. 1973). In
Leppala, the federal district court for the district of Minnesota suggested that, under the theory
later adopted in Carlson v. Smogard,
the legislature never could change any rule or holding developed through the common law process of judicial decisions, for it would deprive someone of claimed due
process. Under this theory, only the courts themselves could change precedents by
judicial decision and any attempt by the legislature . . . to change common law
principles would run afoul of constitutional principles. No where does the Constitution provide that common law judicial decisions are property rights or are guaranteed to continue unchanged, fixed and unaltered. To stretch the due process clause
to this effect is not warranted ....
Id. at 412.
366 298 Minn. at 366, 215 N.W.2d at 618.
367 See Florida Gas Co. v. Spaulding, 243 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1970); Trail Builders Supply
Co. v. Reagan, 235 So. 2d 482, 484-85 (Fla. 1970), discussed in notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
368 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West 1966) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11(1)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978)). The wording of this statute, like that of Minnesota, was in standard
form: "The liability of an employer ...
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee . . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from
such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death.
... Id.
369 An Act Relating to Workmen's Compensation, amending § 440.11, 1971 Fla. Laws ch.
71-190, § 1, 1135-36 (codified at FLA, STAT. ANN. § 440.11(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978)). The
exclusivity provision was amended to add third party tortleasors to the list of parties to whom
the employer was immune from liability. The court commented in Sunspan Eng'r & Constr.
Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975), that the amendment "was obvi-
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Engineering & Construction Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 3 70
decided in 1975, the Florida supreme court held the amended provi3 71
sion unconstitutional.
Under the Florida constitution, access to the courts is provided
"for redress of any injury." 3 72 In interpreting this provision, the
Florida supreme court had held that the legislature could not abrogate a statutory or common law "right without providing a reasonable
alternative ..., unless the Legislature [could] show an overpowering
public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative
method of meeting such public necessity [could] be shown." 373 In
applying this test in Sunspan, the court pointed out that, although
the employer was still subrogated to the employee's rights against the
third party, 3 74 under the statutory amendment the third party lost its
"reciprocal right of' action against the employer. The third party suffer[ed] the burdens and restrictions of the Act, while the employer
receive[d] a windftall ......
375 Furthermore, the court stated that
the objectives of the workers' compensation law were not furthered
by the amendment, 3 76 and "[n]o overpowering or compelling necessity" for the abrogation of the third party's rights was shown. 3 77 The
Sunspan court also indicated that the third party was entitled to protection under the United States Constitution. 3 78 A cause of action,
the court stated, was personal property protected by the fourteenth

ously enacted to abrogate the effect of this Court's decision in Trail Builders." Sunspan, 310 So.
2d at 5.

370310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975).
371 Id. at 7. The lower court had issued an interlocutory order holding the statutory amendment unconstitutional as applied to the third party in the instant case. Id. at 5. The holding of
the Florida supreme court, affirming the lower court, was limited to the active-passive indemnity involved. See id. at 8. Contribution and indemnity on a contractual theory were specifically
excluded from review. Id.
372 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
373 Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
374310 So. 2d at 7. The employer was entitled to reimbursement out of the employee's
recovery from a third party for its workers' compensation payments. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 440.39(2) (West 1966).
375 310 So. 2d at 7.
376 Id. at 7-8. The court did not discuss the possibility that the legislature intended to make
the employer's liability limited and predictable in order to reduce the overall cost of the workers' compensation system. See Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 500, 378
A.2d 53, 67-68 (Law Div. 1977).
377310 So. 2d at 7. The amendment, the court continued, was "an arbitrary and capricious
innovation without any rational basis furthering any overpowering public necessity and is therefore contrary to Article I, § 21, Florida Constitution." Id. at 8.
378 Id. at 8.
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amendment, 3 79 and the statute arbitrarily abolished the third party's
38 0
right to indemnity from the employer.
Other jurisdictions have examined, and rejected, the argument
that the employer's immunity from liability to the third party is unconstitutional. 381 Arcell v. Ashland Chemical Co.,382 a New Jersey
case, contains a thorough treatment of the questions involved. In
Arcell, the third parties, who supplied and manufactured chemicals
which allegedly injured the plaintiff employees, 3 83 were denied indemnity on the ground that the employer owed the manufacturers
and suppliers no independent duty since there was no special legal
relationship between them. 384 Contribution was also denied, since
the employer was not a joint tortteasor as required by the contribution statute.

3 85

In examining whether a denial of equal protection was involved,
the Arcell court applied the "rational basis" test. 386 Following a discussion of the purposes of the workers' compensation law, 38 7 the
court concluded that allowing the third party to recover from the
employer "would clearly frustrate the legislative scheme," because
"[tihe employer's liability would no longer be fixed and predicta-

379 Id. (citing Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882); Ross v. Core, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla.
1950)).
380 310 So. 2d at 8.
381 E.g., Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854, 858 (10th Cir. 1955)
(construing New Mexico statute); Leppala v. Sawbill Canoe Outfitters, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 409,
411-12 (D. Minn. 1973); Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D.D.C.
1951); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 327-28, 144 N.W.2d 303,
311 (1966).
382 152 N.J. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (Law Div. 1977).
383 Id. at 481, 378 A.2d at 58.
384 See id. at 490-97, 378 A.2d at 62-66; text accompanying notes 144-46 supra.
385 152 N.J. Super. at 483-85, 378 A.2d at 59-60; see Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth.,
31 N.J. Super. 356, 360-61, 106 A.2d 752, 754-55 (App. Div. 1954), discussed in text accompanying notes 162-68 supra. The Arcell court also rejected the third parties' Murray Credit
argument that the judgment against them should be reduced pro rata if the employer were
negligent. 152 N.J. Super. at 500-01, 378 A.2d at 68; see note 307-10 supra and accompanying
text.
386 152 N.J. Super. at 498, 378 A.2d at 66. The rational basis test was appropriate because
"no fundamental right or suspect classification [was] involved." Id. Under this test, the statutory
classification must be "reasonable, and not arbitrary," and must bear "a substantial relation to a
valid legislative object." Id. at 498, 378 A.2d at 67.
387 152 N.J. Super. at 499, 378 A.2d at 67. Under the workers' compensation scheme, the
employer's liability, regardless of fault, to pay specified benefits to an injured employee was
balanced by the fixed limitation of its liability. Id.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:238

ble." 38
The legislature had therefore acted reasonably in striking a
3 89
balance among "competing policy considerations."
On this issue of substantive due process, the Arcell court considered whether the exclusive liability provision denied the third parties "property" under the due process clause. 3 90 The court took the
position that, since no right to contribution was recognized at common law 3 9 ' and the contribution statute did not give a third party
any rights against a protected employer, the denial of contribution on
the basis of the exclusive liability provision did not deprive the third
parties of any previously existing rights. 392 Similarly, the denial of
indemnity did not abrogate any previously existing rights, since in
New Jersey a third party never had any right to indemnity from an
employer in the absence of an express contract or a special legal relationship.3 93 Noting that the Minnesota and Florida cases, Carlson
and Sunspan, each involved a statutory amendment which abrogated
a right to indemnity established by prior judicial decisions, 3 94 the
Arcell court easily distinguished these cases. 3 95 The court further argued that even if a property interest were present, the statute merely
had to be reasonable, and not arbitrary or capricious. The court held
that this requirement was satisfied for the same reasons that the statute had been held to have met the equal protection "rational basis"
test. 396

In Arcell, the third parties also contended that their right to procedural due process had been denied. They claimed that they were
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard at both the making
of the employment contract and the workers' compensation hear-

388 Id. at 500, 378 A.2d at 67.
389 Id. at 500, 378 A.2d at 68. The court commented that requiring the employer to contri-

bute if negligent might deter the employer from maintaining unsafe conditions, but held that
the legislature's decision to protect the employer was not unreasonable or arbitrary. Id. at 500,
378 A.2d at 67-68.
390 Id. at 501-02, 378 A.2d at 68.
391 Id. at 502, 378 A.2d at 68; cf. Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa

314, 328, 144 N.W.2d 303, 311 (1966) (upholding common liability requirement for contribution
against claim of unconstitutionality, and commenting, "[a]ny right to common-law contribution
is of rather recent origin in the United States and it is proper for the courts to prescribe the
terms under which -it may be exercised").
392 152 N.J. Super. at 502, 378 A.2d at 69; cf. Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F.
Supp. 779, 782 (D.D.C. 1951) ("the right to contribution is not a vested right on which legislation may not impinge").
393 152 N.J. Super. at 502, 378 A.2d at 69.
394 Id. at 503, 378 A.2d at 69; see notes 348-54 & 367--69 supra and accompanying text.
395 152 N.J. Super. at 503, 378 A.2d at 69.
396 Id. at 502-03, 378 A.2d at 69.
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ings. 397 The court noted that it was the statute, not the parties to
the employment contract, which protected the employer from liability. 398 With respect to the workers' compensation hearings, they did
39 9
not bind the third parties and could not adversely affect them.
Furthermore, the third parties had failed to show that a property
40 0
interest was involved.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

All three parties involved in the workers' compensation
triangle-the employer, the liable third party, and the employeehave justifiable positions in clear conflict with each other. From the
employer's point of' view, the limitation on its liability embodied in
the exclusivity provision is essential to offset the burden of absolute
liability for an employee's injury. 40 1 Since the employer must compensate the employee regardless of whether it is negligent, 40 2 requiring the employer to pay greater damages on account of its negligence
would be unjust.4 0 3 Furthermore, it is only the chance existence of a
397 Id. at 504, 378 A.2d at 69-70. Since compensation coverage is elective in New Jersey,
although presumed in the absence of a contrary written statement, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-9
(West 1959), the employment contract arguably affects the rights of a third party subsequently
held liable to an injured employee. Since the workers' compensation hearings determine
whether the injury to the employee was within the scope of the workers' compensation system,
152 N.J. Super. at 504, 378 A.2d at 70, these hearings also arguably affect the rights of the third
party.
398 152 N.J. Super. at 504, 378 A.2d at 69. "[T]he Legislature," the court stated, "is not
required to give notice and afford an individual an opportunity to be heard before it enacts a
statute." Id.
399 Id. at 504, 378 A.2d at 70. The employees sought "to recover for injuries suffered at [the
employer's] plant. [The third parties were] not barred from proving . . . that the injuries were
suffered elsewhere, and thereby avoid liability." Id. But see Holt v. Ferdon Equip. Co., 72
F.R.D. 564, 569-70 (D.N.J. 1976).
" 152 N.J. Super. at 503, 378 A.2d at 69.
401 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
402 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959). The statute provides in pertinent part:
When employer and employee shall by agreement, either express or implied,
as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of this article compensation for personal injuries to, or for the death of, such employee by accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment shall be made by the employer without regard to
the negligence of the employer, according to the schedule contained in sections
34:15-12 and 34:15-13 of this title . . ..
Id. (emphasis added).
403 See Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 459, 155 A.2d 836, 838 (1959). The Brown court
stated:
Since the employer has been deprived by the Act of his common law defenses,
such as contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule, it
would be. grossly inequitable to impose a common law liability upon him in the
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liable third party which subjects an employer to the possibility of
liability for its negligence. 40 4 The employer is protected from direct
liability to the employee for negligence; 405 if the employer were
solely negligent, its liability would be limited to workers' compensation.
Unlimited contribution or indemnity would subject the employer to
damages likely to be far greater than its workers' compensation liability. 40 6 The employer may reasonably argue that, since it cannot be
40 7
liable directly for such damages, it should not be liable indirectly.
From the third party's point of' view, since the rights of the
employer and the employee against it are preserved by the workers'
compensation law, 40 8 the rights of the third party against the
employer should also be preserved. The third party does not gain
anything from the workers' compensation system, and therefore
should not be deprived of the relief which would be available to it in
the absence of' that system,4 0 9 namely, contribution or indemnity
from a jointly negligent party. The third party should not be saddled
with the entire judgment merely because the other party which contributed to the injury happened to be the injured party's

form of a judgment of contribution without permitting him to interpose any defenses.
Id.; see American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1950); Coates v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.D.C. 1951). See also Roberts v. American
Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43, 49 (Me. 1969); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d
679, 684 (Minn. 1977).
41 See Miller v. DeWitt, 37 I11.2d 273, 276-89, 226 N.E.2d 630, 633-40 (1967), discussed in
note 128 supra.
405 See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
406 Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals Corp., 193 Md.
20, 30, 65 A.2d 304, 308 (1949); see note 325 supra. For examples of dollar amounts of compensation contrasted with total damages, see Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528
F.2d 669, 670 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (compensation $1,454.92, stipulated damages $9,000); Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342, 344 (1st Cir.
1969) (compensation $8,600, settlement $50,000); Stdrk v. Posh Constr. Co., 192 Pa. Super. Ct.
409, 411, 413, 162 A.2d 9, 10-11 (Super. Ct. 1960) (compensation maximum $20,000, judgment
$111,123.42).
407 See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175,
185, 15 N.E.2d 567, 571 (1938) (Crane, C.J.,dissenting). The argument has generally lost in the
courts on the ground that where the employer has an independent duty to the third party, the
employer is held liable to the third party directly, rather than to the employee indirectly. See
Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 851-52, 118 N.W.2d 559, 563 (1962);
Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J. Super. 580, 584, 166 A.2d 784, 786 (App. Div. 1960); Letman v.
Milau Assocs., 77 Misc. 2d 29, 32, 352 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779-80 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
4o1 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
409 Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 364, 63 N.W.2d 355, 365 (1954); McDonnell
Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788, 796 (Mo. 1959); see
Sunspan Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4, 7-8 (Fla. 1975).
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employer. 4 10 Modern comparative negligence statutes, in New Jersey and some other states, manifest a legislative intent to allocate the
burden of liability in proportion to fault. 4 1 1 Permitting the
employer's immunity to extend to third party suits against it would
frustrate this intent. 4 12 The workers' compensation system was designed to adjust the rights and liabilities of the employer and the
employee inter se.41 3 The third party is outside the system and can
justifiably complain if it is forced to bear the burdens of that system
4 14
without any counterbalancing advantages.
From the employee's point of view, the workers' compensation
system provides a minimum recovery for any work-related injury.
Since the employee is generally entitled to this compensation regardless of the cause of the injury, 4 15 the limitation on the amount recoverable from the employer is reasonable.4 16 But, when a third party
negligently caused the injury, the employee clearly has a right to
4 17
common law damages for that negligence.

410 Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 320, 144 N.W.2d 303, 307
(1966); Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum Co., 10 Wash. App. 630, 633, 519 P.2d 22, 25 (1974).
But see Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1974); Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43, 48 (Me. 1969).
411 An increasing number of states lRermit a joint tortfeasor to recover contribution in proportion to fault. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:15-5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. Csv. Pl c. LAW §§ 1401-1402 (McKinney
1976); TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 2212a, 2 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.3(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1975). See also United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410-11
(1975).
412 In New Jersey, the argument has been raised that, in view of the comparative negligence
statute, the employer should no longer be immune from a suit by a third party for contribution.
Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 483-84, 378 A.2d 53, 59-60 (Law Div.
1977). The court held, however, that the definition of "joint tortfeasors" barred recovery of
contribution from an employer of the injured party. See id. at 483, 485, 378 A.2d at 59-60.
413 See McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788,
796 (Mo. 1959); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 273 Or. 162, 176,
539 P.2d 1065, 1072 (1975); note 48 supra and accompanying text.
414 See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W. 2d 679, 684 (Minn. 1977).
415 The New Jersey statute provides that the employer shall compensate the employee
for personal injuries to, or for the death of, such employee by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment . .. in all cases except when the injury or
death is intentionally self-inflicted, or when intoxication is the natural and proximate
cause of injury, and the burden of the proof of such fact shall be upon the
employer.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959). Such exceptions for intoxication and self-infliction of
injury are common. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971).
410 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
417 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1959). The New Jersey statute provides:
Where a third person is liable to the employee or his dependents for an injury
or death, the existence of a right of compensation from the employer or insurance
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A solution to the problem, therefore, must take into account the
following basic considerations:
(1) The employer's right to limited liability;
(2) The third party's right to pay only for its own negligence; and
(3) The employee's right to limited compensation from the
employer, and to common law damages from the third party.
CONCLUSION

Implied indemnity is a crude means of adjusting the rights of the
parties. Furthermore, it is difficult to apply in practice. 4 18 Especially
in those jurisdictions in which contribution follows comparative negligence principles, it is reasonable that the all-or-nothing relief of indemnity be available only to parties without personal fault. 4 19 Where
the indemnitor is a workers' compensation employer such a limitation
has a fuirther justification: requiring the employer to indemnify a third
party destroys the balance of' the workers' compensation system by
420
subjecting the employer to the risk of unlimited liability.
The alternative relief of contribution is not, in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, available against a workers' compensation
employer.421 This burdens the third party with the entire liability,
when it should only be liable for its own negligence.
Where both the employer and the third party have negligently
contributed to the cause of' the employee's injury, there is only one
solution which takes into account all of the factors involved. Under
this proposal, which is similar to that of' Cohen and Dougherty, 4 22
indemnity is available to the third party only where the employer

carrier under this statute shall not operate as a bar to the action of the employee or
his dependents, nor be regarded as establishing a measure of damage therein.
Id.
418 See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972), discussed in notes 243-45 supra and accompanying text; O'Donnell,
supra note 49, passim. O'Donnell described implied indemnity as follows:
[lI]t is . . . difficult to say why one claimant should receive this boon while another
should not. There are an abundance of formulae and theories which purport to
provide the answer, but none is wholly satisfactory. Those which are most widely
accepted are little more than conclusory statements; others . . . offer little practical
guidance ....
Id. at 268.
419 See, e.g., Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, 32 N.J. 55, 79-81, 159 A.2d 97,
109-11 (1960).
420 See notes 401-07 supra and accompanying text.
421 See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
422 Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 68, at 606, discussed in notes 317-20 supra and accompanying text.
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breached an independent duty owed to the third party, and the third
party is without personal fault. Where indemnity is not available, the
third party pays only in proportion to its own negligence. The
employer also pays in proportion to its own negligence in relation to
the total damages, 42 3 but only up to the limit of its workers' compensation liability.
Where only one party was negligent, the employee recovers the
same amount as under the present law. For example, if the damages
were $50,000 and the workers' compensation award was $8,600, and
the third party was 100% negligent, it pays $50,000 and the employer
pays nothing. If, on the other hand, the employer was 100% negligent, it pays $8,600 and the third party pays nothing.
If both parties were negligent, the employee recovers more than
the workers' compensation amount up to a maximum of the total
damages-in the example, between $8,600 and $50,000. The
employee may recover less than the common law damages because,
with respect to the employer's portion of the fault, the employee has
lost its right to common law damages in return for a guaranteed
42 4
minimum recovery.
The exact amount the employee recovers depends upon the percentage of' causal negligence in each of the two systems, workers'
compensation and the common law. In the example given, if both the
employer and the third party were 50% negligent, the third party
pays $25,000 (half the damages), the employer pays $8,600 (half the
damages up to the limit of its workers' compensation liability), and
the employee receives $33,600.
423 It could be argued that the employer should be required to pay in proportion to its
negligence in relation to its own total potential liability (workers' compensation), rather than in
relation to the total damages. Davis, supra note 12, at 580-81, discussed in notes 321-25 supra
and accompanying text. There are two reasons why this system is not recommended here. First,
from a practical standpoint, such a method of calculating liability has the final effect of reducing
the 'employee's recovery. Second, from a theoretical standpoint, it is not intended that the
employer should pay for its negligence. Rather, the employer has an absolute liability to pay
workers' compensation. It is absolved to the extent that the third party's proportion of the total
causal negligence is so great that the third party should, in justice, pay part or all of the amount
for which the employer would otherwise be responsible. The recommended scheme thereby
differs from the present law in majority states, such as New Jersey, where the employer is
absolved of its entire responsibility for workers' compensation whenever the third party is liable
to any extent, and the entire burden is thrown upon the third party regardless of the degrees of
negligence involved.
424 It should be recognized that when the third party's proportion of the causal negligence is
slight and the employer's is relatively great, it is only fair that the employee recover less than
the full common law damages; it is merely part of the trade-off for guaranteed minimum compensation. Only to the extent, and in the proportion, that the causal negligence lay outside the
workers' compensation system should the employee be entitled to common law damages.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:238

Following the principles of' comparative negligence, further adjustments can be made for the relative negligence of the parties. For
example, if the employer were ninety percent negligent and the third
party were ten percent negligent, the employer would pay $8,600,
the third party would pay $5,000, and the employee would recover
$13,600. On the other hand, if the third party were ninety percent
negligent and the employer were ten percent negligent, the third
party would pay $45,000, the employer would pay $5,000, and the
employee would recover a total of $50,000.
The result is as follows: the third party pays only in proportion to
its negligence; the employer retains its right to reimbursement when
the employee recovers from a third party, except that it loses that
right to the extent that its own negligence contributed to the total
damages; 425 and the employee receives a fair payment from each, in
accordance with the two systems governing their respective relationships to the injured employee.
In many jurisdictions, the solution described here cannot be accomplished without legislative change. 426 The courts have wrestled
with the problem of the conflict between workers' compensation and
the common law long enough; as numerous courts and commentators
have previously pointed out,4 27 the various legislatures should under-

42 The employer is absolved of its responsibility for workers' compensation where, and to
the extent that, the difference between the total damages and the third party's liability for those
damages (calculated in proportion to its negligence) is less than the workers' compensation
amount.
42 The statutes providing that the employer be reimbursed out of the employee's recovery
from a third party are absolute in their terms and do not allow for an exception to be made
when the employer is negligent. E.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40(b) (West 1959); see notes 12 & 177
supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, if the majority view of the common liability requirement for contribution is correct, see note 157 supra and accompanying text, there is no
support in the statutes for requiring contribution in any form from the employer.
Where such statutory limitations do not apply, a court might reduce the damages against
the third party and deny or reduce the reimbursement to the employer in accordance with
equitable principles and comparative negligence theory.
427 E.g.,
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285-86
(1952); Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, 1158 (4th Cir.) (Hall,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K.
Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Solsvik v.
Maremar Compania Naviera, S.A., 399 F. Supp. 712, 714 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Kamali v.
Hawaiian Elec. Co., 54 Haw. 153, 159, 504 P.2d 861, 865 (1972); Iowa Power & Light
Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 322, 144 N.W.2d 303, 308 (1966); Lejeune v.
Highlands Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 531, 533 (La. Ct. of App. 1973), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 903
(1974); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 682, 39 A.2d 858, 862 (1944); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Westerlind, 373 N.E.2d 957, 959 (Mass. 1978); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257

1978]

COMMENT

303

take a thorough review and reform of the present statutes and case
law in order to resolve the problem.
Marion Percell
N.W.2d 679, 688 (Minn. 1977); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 561 P.2d 450,
454 (Nev. 1977); Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 463, 155 A.2d 836, 840 (1950) (Jones, J.,
concurring); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 76.53, at 14-407; Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 959, 976
(1956); Note, 1 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 134, 160 (1974).

